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DIGNITY AND SOCIAL MEANING: 
OBERGEFELL, WINDSOR, AND LAWRENCE 
AS CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 
Steve Sanders* 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s three most important gay and lesbian rights 
decisions—Obergefell v. Hodges, United States v. Windsor, and Lawrence 
v. Texas—are united by the principle that gays and lesbians are entitled to 
dignity.  Beyond their tangible consequences, the common constitutional evil 
of state bans on same-sex marriage, the federal Defense of Marriage Act, 
and sodomy laws was that they imposed dignitary harm. 
This Article explores how the gay and lesbian dignity cases exemplify the 
process by which constitutional law emerges from a social and cultural 
dialogue in which the Supreme Court actively participates.  In doing so, it 
draws on the scholarly literatures on dialogic judicial review and the role of 
social meaning in constitutional law.  It illuminates how the Supreme Court 
interprets democratic preferences and constructs social meaning in order to 
apply fundamental constitutional norms to emerging legal claims. 
Contrary to the speculations of some commentators, “dignity” in these 
cases did not operate as some new form of constitutional right.  Rather, the 
identification and protection of dignitary interests served as the unifying 
principle for a process, unfolding in three cases over thirteen years, through 
which constitutional law was brought into alignment with evolving public 
attitudes and policy preferences.  The dignity decisions should be understood 
as majoritarian, not as acts of judicial will.  They were broadly accepted 
because the Court’s insights about the status of gays and lesbians in 
American society were consistent with dramatic and long-term changes in 
cultural and public attitudes.  As culture and attitudes evolved, so did the 
social meaning of anti-gay laws.  Sodomy laws and marriage restrictions, 
once accepted as presumptively constitutional protections of tradition and 
public morality, increasingly came to be understood as impositions of stigma 
and humiliation—the kind of expressive harms that the U.S. Constitution 
forbids. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In three cases decided over thirteen years, each dealing with a different 
legal question, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the U.S. Constitution’s 
guarantees of liberty or equal protection to protect gays and lesbians against 
discrimination by the federal or state governments.  Lawrence v. Texas1 
struck down sodomy laws in 2003.  Ten years later in 2013, United States v. 
Windsor2 invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which 
prohibited federal recognition of same-sex marriages that were legal under 
state law.  And in 2015, Obergefell v. Hodges3 swept aside remaining state-
level bans on same-sex marriage, which made marriage equality a reality 
nationwide. 
The common thread in these decisions, all written by Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy, was the centrality of the idea of “dignity.”  According to the Court, 
dignity attended the liberty that is inherent in making personal choices about 
love and sexuality;4 the rights and public recognition that are bestowed by 
states in marriage;5 and the principle of equal treatment in access to a 
 
 1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 3. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 4. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (“It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose 
to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and 
still retain their dignity as free persons.”). 
 5. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (calling the status of marriage “a far-reaching legal 
acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by 
the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages”). 
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fundamental right.6  And dignity was what was lost when a person could be 
targeted for criminal prosecution for intimacy with another adult;7 when 
one’s marriage could be disparaged by the federal government;8 and when a 
legal marriage could be, in effect, summarily voided by one’s own home 
state.9  The majority opinions in these cases used the word “dignity” (or the 
variations “dignitary” or “indignity”) three times in Lawrence,10 ten times in 
Windsor,11 and ten times in Obergefell.12 
These decisions, especially Obergefell, have provoked speculation about 
whether there is a new constitutional “right to dignity.”  For example, 
Laurence Tribe, who embraces this idea, believes that “Obergefell’s chief 
jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound the double helix of Due 
Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity.”13  Other 
commentators have suggested how new constitutional dignity-based 
arguments might apply to such controversies as transgender students’ 
bathroom rights,14 access to abortion,15 and a right to “nonmarriage.”16  Still 
others have expressed skepticism toward dignity arguments in claims for 
constitutional rights.17 
 
 6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (“[Petitioners] ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the 
law.  The Constitution grants them that right.”). 
 7. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (noting that, at the time, sodomy in Texas was “a criminal 
offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged”). 
 8. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here 
in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter 
into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”). 
 9. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (observing that a home state’s refusal to recognize a 
valid same-sex marriage procured in another state “inflict[s] substantial and continuing harm 
on same-sex couples”). 
 10. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 574–75. 
 11. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681, 2689, 2692–94, 2696. 
 12. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594, 2595–97, 2599, 2603, 2606, 2608. 
 13. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity:  Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17 
(2015) [hereinafter Tribe, Equal Dignity].  Similar themes are explored in Laurence H. Tribe, 
Lawrence v. Texas:  The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1893, 1902–07 (2004) (describing the Lawrence Court’s “synthesis” of equal protection 
and substantive due process). 
 14. Kristi L. Bowman, A Counterfactual History of Transgender Students’ Rights, 20 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 28 (2018) (arguing that “current transgender rights cases have much 
to build on in Justice Kennedy’s ‘equal dignity’ jurisprudence as they work their way through 
lower federal courts”). 
 15. Erika Hanson, Lighting the Way Towards Liberty:  The Right to Abortion After 
Obergefell and Whole Woman’s Health, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 94 (2017) (arguing 
that Obergefell “illustrates how the core principles of autonomy, dignity, and equality 
strengthen all substantive due process rights, including the right to abortion”). 
 16. Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 425, 433 (2017) (describing how Obergefell, including its principles of dignity and anti-
stigma, “can strengthen, rather than foreclose, a constitutional right to nonmarriage”). 
 17. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Dangers of a Constitutional ‘Right to Dignity,’ ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-dangerous-
doctrine-of-dignity/391796/ [https://perma.cc/MJ4B-N3US] (warning that, “down the line, 
the right to dignity—now celebrated by liberals for what it means to gay rights—could 
ultimately produce other decisions in unrelated cases that they would not be so quick to 
celebrate”). 
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Scholarly commentary about these cases has addressed this idea of dignity 
mostly as a matter of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine.  That is, it has sought 
to understand how the principle of dignity might amplify or expand existing 
guarantees of equality and liberty, or whether a right to dignity can or should 
serve as the basis for claims by new groups, or in new contexts, about these 
constitutional rights.18 
This Article builds on that work and extends it in a new direction.  My 
primary focus is on constitutional interpretation, not doctrine.  Rather than 
addressing dignity as a distinct constitutional right, this Article explores a 
topic previously unaddressed in scholarly commentary:  how the 
identification and protection of dignitary interests in the gay and lesbian cases 
served as the unifying principle for a process, unfolding in three cases over 
thirteen years, through which constitutional law was brought into alignment 
with mainstream American social attitudes and policy preferences. 
The gay and lesbian dignity cases, as I will refer to them, illustrate how 
new constitutional law can emerge from a social and cultural dialogue in 
which the Supreme Court actively participates.  This trilogy of decisions 
provides a case study for understanding how constitutional law can evolve in 
response to developments in society and culture—specifically, how the 
Constitution’s principles of equality and liberty were interpreted to 
encompass new legal claims that had come to enjoy widespread public 
support, even though the claims once would have been considered 
unthinkable.19 
In exploring the role of dignity in Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, this 
Article draws on two avenues of scholarship:  one that explores how 
constitutional law takes cognizance of the social meaning of government 
laws and practices;20 the other that explains judicial review and constitutional 
interpretation as a dialogic process, one that is shaped not only by precedent 
and doctrine, but also by the arguments of social movements, the views of 
other nonjudicial actors, and ultimately (to borrow Barry Friedman’s 
phrase21), the “will of the people.”22  Reva B. Siegel has argued that these 
“pathways of responsiveness” among citizens and those who interpret the 
 
 18. See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Cooper, The Power of Dignity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 3, 20 
(2015) (“It is possible that Obergefell and its dignity (anti-humiliation) approach to justice 
may have lasting power, not just for gay men and lesbians, but also more broadly.  Indeed, if 
courts are inclined to recognize liberty-associated dignity concerns, it will be notably more 
difficult for defendants to legally justify discrimination.”). 
 19. Barry Friedman, The Will of the People and the Process of Constitutional Change, 
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1232, 1248–49 (2010) (observing that when “[c]ircumstances and the 
evolving views of the American people” come to sympathize with a group’s constitutional 
claims, “courts ultimately will ratify those understandings” and “the implausible becomes 
plausible”). 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 22. See infra Part III. 
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Constitution are “crucial to securing the Constitution’s democratic 
authority.”23 
When it invoked the idea of dignity in these cases, the Court spoke in the 
vernacular, in a way that exposed “the social meaning and the expressive 
dimensions of” the anti-gay laws being challenged.24  The Court recurred to 
the concept of dignity to explain how criminal sodomy laws and federal and 
state marriage restrictions, once assumed by most people to be legitimate and 
necessary for protecting tradition and public morality, had become repugnant 
to constitutional equality and liberty because their effects, as they had come 
to be understood by the larger society, were to demean and impose stigma.25  
Their harms and constitutional defects “result[ed] from the ideas or attitudes 
expressed” by these laws as much as or more than “the more tangible or 
material consequences” they imposed.26  To say that a law imposes stigma 
merely describes an effect; to say that a law offends dignity incorporates 
assumptions about the group targeted by the stigma:  that its members are 
entitled to the same high regard that government gives to the rest of its 
citizens. 
The gay and lesbian dignity cases were products of constitutional dialogue 
between the Court and society at large.  The decisions built upon one another, 
moving over the course of thirteen years from the least controversial issue 
(sodomy laws) to the most controversial (marriage equality in the states).27  
The decisions forthrightly embraced social change,28 and they recognized 
that the social meaning of sodomy laws and marriage restrictions had 
changed as Americans’ attitudes about these issues, and about the status of 
gays and lesbians generally, continued to evolve.29  The decisions reflected 
how questions of sexual orientation had transitioned, as Martha Nussbaum 
has put it, from a “politics of disgust” to a “politics of humanity.”30 
The dialogic model of judicial review posits that courts, in Friedman’s 
words, “do not stand aloof from society and declare rights,” but instead “they 
interact on a daily basis with society, taking part in an interpretive 
 
 23. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change:  The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2006). 
 24. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps:  Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, 
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 726 (1998). 
 25. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602, 2608 (2015) (discussing that state 
marriage bans “impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter,” thus 
denying “equal dignity in the eyes of the law”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2693 (2013) (explaining that DOMA’s purpose and effect were to impose “stigma upon all 
who enter into same-sex marriages,” and such “interference with the equal dignity of same-
sex marriages” was its “essence”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (observing 
that a sodomy statute imposed “stigma” as a criminal offense “with all that imports for the 
dignity of the persons charged”). 
 26. Pildes, supra note 24, at 755. 
 27. See infra Part V.B. 
 28. See infra Part V.C. 
 29. See infra Part IV.C. 
 30. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY:  SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xix (2010). 
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dialogue.”31  In this process, “[p]opular politics and Court decisions, moving 
together sometimes in harmony and sometimes not, . . . shape[] the meaning 
of the Constitution.”32  Contrary to the understanding of constitutional law 
as a top-down enterprise conducted solely by judges, this model of judicial 
review recognizes that, as Robert Post has explained, “constitutional law and 
culture are locked in a dialectical relationship.”33 
Some critics, including the dissenting justices, have condemned these 
decisions as products of judicial hubris.34  However, to the extent that the 
point of such criticism is that the Court was substituting its own judgment for 
that of the people, it is mistaken.35  All of these decisions should be 
understood as majoritarian, not countermajoritarian, in that the Court was 
catching up with public attitudes and a constitutional culture36 where steadily 
expanding numbers of Americans rejected the criminalization of gay sex and 
supported marriage equality.37  A majority of Americans did not need to be 
browbeaten by the Court into the conclusion that sodomy laws demeaned 
same-sex relationships,38 that DOMA worked gratuitous and harmful 
discrimination,39 or that state constitutional amendments banning same-sex 
marriage imposed stigma40 because those conclusions about social meaning 
and dignitary harm were consistent with a dramatic evolution in public 
attitudes and culture toward gays and lesbians that had taken place over more 
than forty years.41 
Once these social meanings of sodomy laws and marriage restrictions are 
understood as offenses to dignity, the holdings of Lawrence, Windsor, and 
Obergefell can be understood as applications of a principle at the core of the 
Fourteenth Amendment:  that government may not enact laws whose primary 
 
 31. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 585 (1993). 
 32. Friedman, supra note 19, at 1235. 
 33. Robert C. Post, Foreword:  Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and 
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003). 
 34. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (calling the majority decision “an act of will, not legal judgment”); Emily Buss, 
The Divisive Supreme Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 25 (describing Obergefell as being 
“widely perceived as the work of a partisan elite imposing its policy preferences on the 
American people” and arguing that the question should have remained longer with the lower 
courts); Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004) (characterizing the Lawrence majority opinion as “a tissue 
of sophistries embroidered with a bit of sophomoric philosophizing”). 
 35. See infra notes 331–33 and accompanying text. 
 36. For a discussion of the idea of “constitutional culture,” see infra notes 188–98 and 
accompanying text. 
 37. A month before Lawrence was decided, 59 percent of Americans agreed that “gay or 
lesbian relations between consenting adults” should be legal, up from 33 percent in 1986. Gay 
and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, http://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/rights.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
6UFQ-KFYE] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).  A month before Obergefell was decided, 60 
percent said same-sex marriage should be legal, up from 27 percent in 1996. Id. 
 38. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
 39. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (noting that DOMA’s purpose 
and effect were to impose “stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages”). 
 40. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (discussing the idea that state 
marriage bans “impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter”). 
 41. For a discussion of this history and the data on public attitudes, see infra Part II. 
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effect is to demean and stigmatize.42  Because all three of these cases deploy 
dignity as an anti-stigma principle, they can be harmonized with well-
established Fourteenth Amendment values43 (or, in the case of Windsor, 
analogous values applied to the federal government through the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).44 
The gay and lesbian dignity cases thus illustrate the operation of a 
common-law, or “living,” Constitution—that is, a Constitution whose 
fundamental principles of equality and liberty adapt and are applied to 
address new claims in new contexts.  As Daniel Conkle has written, 
 When the Supreme Court interprets the capacious language of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, its task is art as much as science, 
judicial statesmanship as much as technical craft.  The Court mediates past, 
present, and future, identifying individual rights that befit the evolving 
political morality of our society.  By its very nature, the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects minority rights from state and local majoritarian 
oppression.  But what rights, in particular, does the Amendment protect?  
In deciding this question, the Justices rely in part on precedent and in part 
on their own understandings of liberty and equality.  At the same time, 
however, the Court generally acts, and properly so, in a manner that tracks 
the evolving values of the country as a whole.45 
In Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, the concept of dignity was the vehicle 
the Court used to translate the nation’s “evolving political morality” about 
the status of gays and lesbians into holdings of constitutional law.  To say 
that our political morality has evolved on matters like sodomy laws and 
marriage restrictions is to say that a majority of Americans have come to 
understand the social meaning of these forms of discrimination in a different 
way than they previously did—as matters of dignitary harm—and that that 
difference has constitutional significance. 
This Article seeks to contribute to our understanding of how judicial 
review works not in theory, but in practice.46  Regardless of one’s attitudes 
about the appropriate methods of constitutional interpretation or the role of 
 
 42. See infra Part IV.B. 
 43. See infra Part IV.C. 
 44. Windsor was decided under “the guarantee of equal protection . . . applied to the 
Federal Government through the Fifth Amendment.” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.  This Article 
will not belabor that technical point. 
 45. Daniel O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 89 IND. L.J. 27, 
28 (2014); see also Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. 
REV. 63, 128–33 (2006) [hereinafter, Conkle, Three Theories] (advocating a substantive due 
process “theory of evolving national values”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court Follows 
Public Opinion, in LEGAL CHANGE:  LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 21, 23 
(Jennifer Weiss-Wolf & Jeanine Plant-Chirlin eds., 2015) (observing that “the Court usually 
pays attention to an actual or emerging moral consensus, certainly with respect to fundamental 
rights,” and that “[i]f most people have come to share a moral commitment, or if the arc of 
history is clearly on one side, then judges are likely to pay respectful attention”). 
 46. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 1240 (“What scholars should not be asking is how to 
justify judicial review as a counter-majoritarian institution.  Instead, they should be studying 
how it operates in differing circumstances, posing normative questions and suggestions for 
change in light of that reality.”). 
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the Supreme Court in a democratic society, the dialogic model of judicial 
review provides a lens for understanding a specific yet momentous 
development:  the extension of equality and liberty protections to a group—
gays and lesbians—that was once despised by most of society, but that now 
is associated positively with three of the most consequential decisions in 
modern constitutional law. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I briefly examines human dignity 
as a constitutional principle.  Part II sketches the impact of the LGBT social 
movement and the dramatic changes it produced in public attitudes on 
specific legal questions and the status of gays and lesbians in the larger 
culture.  Part III develops necessary theoretical framing by explaining 
dialogic judicial review—the idea that constitutional law is shaped not by 
judges working in isolation, but by interaction among judicial interpretations, 
public understandings, and constitutional culture. 
Part IV begins by explaining how the Court’s exposition of a law’s social 
meaning—that is, the expressive effect a law has acquired, whether intended 
or not—often has determined the outcome of constitutional cases, 
particularly in matters dealing with equality.  It then argues that the trilogy 
of gay and lesbian dignity cases demonstrated a Supreme Court that was in 
dialogue with the society at large about the social meaning of government-
imposed discrimination against gays and lesbians.  The Court appropriately 
gave legal substance to this attitudinal and cultural change when it concluded 
that the social meaning of sodomy laws and marriage restrictions was now 
understood to be the imposition of dignitary harm—the kind of stigma and 
humiliation that is repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Part V considers how, in more general ways apart from their focus on 
stigma and social meaning, the gay and lesbian dignity decisions manifested 
constitutional dialogue:  they accurately reflected majority attitudes, 
contributed to a dynamic process of attitudinal change and legal innovation, 
and expressly embraced social and cultural change regarding gays and 
lesbians while articulating an evolving conception of constitutional 
guarantees. 
I.  DIGNITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE 
Human dignity has been the subject of philosophical and religious thought 
for some 2500 years.47  Its status as a constitutional value or constitutional 
right, and more broadly as a subject of human rights discourse, is a more 
modern phenomenon having emerged in the period immediately following 
World War II.48 
The preamble to the U.N. Charter, enacted in 1945, expresses the United 
Nations’s determination to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
 
 47. AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 15–16 (2015).  For a bibliography of major sources about the concept 
of human dignity, see id. at 15 n.1. 
 48. Id. at 34. 
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women.”49  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the 
U.N. General Assembly in 1948, says that “[a]ll human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights.”50  And the German Basic Law, the 
constitution of postwar Germany, which took effect in 1949, declares, 
“Human dignity shall be inviolable.  To respect and protect it shall be the 
duty of all state authority.”51 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, dignity became a central concern 
of constitution writers, constitutional lawyers and scholars, and the 
international human rights community.52  It is a cornerstone of several 
modern constitutions, where it is expressly guaranteed as a right.53  Yet, the 
“precise definition” of constitutional dignity remains “elusive.”54  Professor 
Neomi Rao has observed that “the value of human dignity comes in part from 
its evolving and plastic nature—its appeal, as well as its difficulties, lies in 
its amorphous content.”55 
In the United States, the term “dignity” does not appear in the text of the 
Constitution, and the Supreme Court has never sought to define or recognize 
it as a right to which specific claims can be made.56  Nor have the “content 
and scope of the social and constitutional value of human dignity . . . been 
sufficiently clarified” by the Supreme Court or “reached the level of 
importance that would allow it to be recognized as a constitutional right 
derived from one of the existing constitutional rights.”57 
Still, references to human or individual dignity as an ideal or value have 
appeared in many Supreme Court opinions, beginning in the 1940s “in 
dissenting opinions arguing for a more robust conception of individual 
liberties,”58 and “[s]ince that time, the Supreme Court has increasingly relied 
on concepts of personal and human dignity to explain, develop, and broaden 
various constitutional protections.”59  By and large, the Court has “treated 
human dignity as a value underlying, or giving meaning to, existing 
 
 49. U.N. Charter art. 16. 
 50. G.A. Res. 217 (III), at 72 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 51. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. I, § 1 (Ger.), translation at http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0022 [https://perma.cc/6K7P-RTRR]. 
 52. See generally MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY:  ITS HISTORY AND MEANING (2012). 
 53. BARAK, supra note 47, at 139 (listing the constitutions of Germany, Colombia, Israel, 
Russia, South Africa, Poland, and Switzerland). 
 54. Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 201, 205 (2008). 
 55. Id.  Rao suggests that the use of the term “dignity” by constitutional courts around the 
world can be categorized around three general “concepts”:  the “inherent worth of each 
individual”; as grounds for enforcing various substantive values which “promote the public 
good and improve the lives of individuals”; and as a form of “recognition” which “requires 
esteem and respect for the particularity of each individual” and “creates a political demand for 
the state and other individuals to accept and approve of one’s lifestyle and personal choices.” 
Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 
187, 222, 243 (2011). 
 56. Rao, supra note 54, at 202. 
 57. BARAK, supra note 47, at 188. 
 58. Rao, supra note 54, at 202 (footnote omitted). 
 59. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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constitutional rights and guarantees.”60  By one count published in 2011—
before Windsor or Obergefell—the justices had used the word “dignity” in 
more than nine hundred opinions.61 
Dignity has been discussed in majority or dissenting opinions as a value 
underlying claims arising under the First Amendment right to free speech,62 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures,63 the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination,64 
the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments,65 
and various lines of doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment, including the 
right to privacy,66 the ability to choose the timing and circumstances of one’s 
own death when death is imminent,67 and equal protection against racial 
discrimination in education and access to accommodations.68  Indeed, the 
point that racial discrimination is incompatible with the dignity of a citizen 
in a free society continues to be a core theme of the Court’s contemporary 
equal protection cases addressing race and ethnicity.69  In the area of 
substantive due process, cases like Lawrence and Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey70 have emphasized the relationship 
between dignity and the liberty and autonomy principles of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.71  These cases capture an understanding of dignity 
roughly akin to what the comparative constitutional scholar and former 
Israeli Supreme Court jurist Aharon Barak has called the “freedom to write 
[one’s own] life story.”72  Dissenting in Bowers v. Hardwick,73 which upheld 
sodomy laws but was later overruled by Lawrence,74 Justice John Paul 
Stevens invoked “our tradition of respect for the dignity of individual choice 
in matters of conscience”—the first use of the term “dignity” in a Supreme 
 
 60. Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 743 (2006). 
 61. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 178–79 
(2011). 
 62. See Goodman, supra note 60, at 786–89. 
 63. Id. at 767–72. 
 64. Id. at 765–67. 
 65. Id. at 772–78. 
 66. Id. at 759–62. 
 67. Id. at 779–83. 
 68. Id. at 762–65. 
 69. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the principal reasons 
race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person 
to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”). 
 70. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 71. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (holding that “intimate and personal 
choices . . . central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851)). 
 72. BARAK, supra note 47, at 144; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 746–
47 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that allowing a terminally ill person, rather than 
the state, to make decisions about her quality of life “gives proper recognition to the 
individual’s interest in choosing a final chapter that accords with her life story”). 
 73. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 74. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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Court opinion dealing with gay and lesbian rights.75  Even before the full trio 
of gay and lesbian dignity cases had been decided, scholars such as Reva B. 
Siegel were exploring the meaning of dignity for Fourteenth Amendment 
rights and liberties such as reproductive choice.76 
The gay and lesbian dignity cases, especially Obergefell, have prompted 
scholarly commentary seeking to understand the significance of the Court’s 
use of dignity and whether it carries enduring meaning for equality or 
substantive due process jurisprudence.  For example, Laurence Tribe argues 
that “Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound 
the double helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into the equal dignity 
doctrine.”77  This doctrine of equal dignity, Tribe says, is “the rubric under 
which fundamental rights should be evaluated going forward.”78  Tribe 
believes that Obergefell’s full meaning has yet to be realized:  “Equal dignity, 
a concept with a robust doctrinal pedigree, does not simply look back to 
purposeful past subordination, but rather lays the groundwork for an ongoing 
constitutional dialogue about fundamental rights and the meaning of 
equality.”79 
A common thread in the post-Obergefell scholarship is the explanation of 
dignity’s potential for advancing the rights of marginalized groups, including 
but not limited to gays and lesbians, and combatting discrimination.  For 
example, Elizabeth B. Cooper suggests that Obergefell “reflects an 
acceptance of and respect for gay men and lesbians that,” even beyond the 
question of marriage, “will profoundly change not only how the law treats 
LGBT individuals, but also how we are treated by others, as well as how we 
perceive ourselves.”80  Obergefell’s “dignity (and anti-humiliation) approach 
to justice may have lasting power,” she says, “not just for gay men and 
lesbians, but also more broadly” as courts “recognize liberty-associated 
dignity concerns” and thus make it “notably more difficult for defendants to 
legally justify discrimination.”81  Luke A. Boso proposes that “equal dignity 
is one theory of Equal Protection that can explain when governmental 
stereotyping is unconstitutional” and that Obergefell unifies themes in the 
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence of “anti-group subordination” 
and individual liberty.82  Commentators have speculated about how dignity-
based arguments stemming from the gay and lesbian rights cases might apply 
to such controversies as transgender students’ bathroom rights, access to 
abortion, and a right to “nonmarriage.”83  In addition, one commentator has 
 
 75. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem’l 
Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719–20 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
 76. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:  Abortion 
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008). 
 77. Tribe, Equal Dignity, supra note 13, at 17. 
 78. Id. at 20. 
 79. Id. at 17. 
 80. Cooper, supra note 18, at 5. 
 81. Id. at 20. 
 82. Luke A. Boso, Dignity, Inequality, and Stereotypes, 92 WASH L. REV. 1119, 1122 
(2017). 
 83. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
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suggested that the Supreme Court should rely on Obergefell’s references to 
human dignity to support a new fundamental right to food security.84 
Not all commentators agree upon the future ramifications of the Court’s 
use of dignity.  Kenji Yoshino believes that, whereas cases such as Lawrence, 
Casey, and Windsor relied heavily on the notion of dignity, Obergefell gives 
more emphasis to liberty.85  Jeffrey Rosen has warned that 
“constitutionalizing” the “injury” of same-sex marriage bans “with broad 
abstractions like dignity may lead to results in the future that liberals come 
to regret” because dignitary harm could be claimed by litigants challenging 
such things as gun regulations, smoking bans, or nondiscrimination laws that 
some conservative Christians see as violating their religious liberty.86  Yuvraj 
Joshi criticizes Obergefell for shifting the constitutional meaning of dignity 
away from respect for intimate choices and the kind of personal autonomy 
that was extolled in Casey to a more conservative meaning, the 
“respectability of choices and choice makers.”87 
Dignity holds the potential to shape new constitutional doctrine, but how 
exactly that might happen remains largely undeveloped.  The Court has 
continued to invoke dignity in constitutional cases:  in a 2017 Sixth 
Amendment decision about juror racial bias, Justice Kennedy went so far as 
to declare broadly that the nation has a “commitment to the equal dignity of 
all persons.”88  But, the Court has yet to give any true independent substance 
to constitutional dignity.  It has not engaged in the sort of synthesizing, 
clarifying analysis—historical, doctrinal, or comparative—that would be 
necessary to make dignity a distinct constitutional right in the conventional 
sense.  And Justice Kennedy’s retirement from the Court likely will result in 
fewer opinions in which dignity is a prominent theme. 
As the remainder of this Article explains, dignity in Obergefell, Windsor, 
and Lawrence is best understood not as a new doctrine, but as a framework 
for understanding one particular set of developments.  It is a principle which 
unites three cases in which the Court articulated the social meaning of anti-
gay government discrimination and translated the nation’s “evolving political 
morality” about the status of gays and lesbians into protections afforded by 
constitutional law against governmental discrimination. 
 
 84. See generally Maxine D. Goodman, The Obergefell Marriage Equality Decision, with 
Its Emphasis on Human Dignity, and a Fundamental Right to Food Security, 13 HASTINGS 
RACE & POVERTY L.J. 149 (2016). 
 85. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?:  Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
147, 170 (2015). 
 86. Rosen, supra note 17. 
 87. Yuvraj Joshi, The Respectable Dignity of Obergefell v. Hodges, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 
CIRCUIT 117, 117 (2015).  On this reading, “[t]he ‘dignity’ that Obergefell invokes expects 
same-sex couples to make choices regarding their relationships that are the same as the 
dominant culture.” Id. at 122. 
 88. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017) (holding that where a juror 
makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial prejudice to convict a criminal 
defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way to permit 
the trial court to consider the evidence and impact of the juror’s statement). 
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II.  “FROM OUTLAWS TO IN-LAWS”:  THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
ATTITUDES TOWARD GAYS AND LESBIANS 
Writing in 1967 amid a political and cultural climate in which police could 
harass, persecute, and humiliate homosexuals with impunity, an editorial 
writer for the then-new magazine Los Angeles Advocate89 wrote, “We do not 
ask for our rights on bended knee.  We demand them, standing tall, as 
dignified human beings.  We will not go away.”90  Writing in 1999—before 
Lawrence, before it was legal for gays and lesbians to marry in any state, and 
while political backlash against the same-sex marriage movement was still 
reaching its height—journalists Dudley Clendinen and Adam Nagourney 
nonetheless wrote that “the movement for gay identity and gay rights has 
come further and faster, in terms of change, than any other that has gone 
before it in this nation.”91 
In 2012, the year before Windsor and three years before Obergefell, social 
commentator E. J. Graff marveled, 
Fifty years ago, being gay put you beyond the social pale.  You could be 
savagely beaten, kicked out of public spaces and private clubs, arrested, 
fired, expelled from your family, and scorned as a pariah.  Today, lesbians 
and gay men are all but equal, with full marriage rights in view—supported 
by President Barack Obama in action and words.  How did we win so much 
so fast?92 
The dramatic changes in public attitudes and American culture that paved 
the way to Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell did not arise organically.  
They were the products of a half century of social-movement activism, public 
and private discourses, legal reform, legislative and political campaigns, and 
court decisions.93  Writing a few days after the Obergefell decision, journalist 
Molly Ball observed, “What changed . . . wasn’t the Constitution—it was the 
country.  And what changed the country was a movement.”94  The Court’s 
decision “wasn’t solely or even primarily the work of the lawyers and 
plaintiffs who brought the case.  It was the product of the decades of activism 
 
 89. Today, this national publication is known simply as the Advocate. 
 90. Editorial, Harassment?  Hell No!, L.A. ADVOCATE, Oct. 1967, at 6. 
 91. DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD:  THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD 
A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 13 (1999). 
 92. E. J. Graff, How the Gay-Rights Movement Won, AM. PROSPECT (June 7, 2012), 
http://prospect.org/article/how-gay-rights-movement-won [https://perma.cc/Z9ND-5CER]. 
 93. For in-depth treatments of the history of the gay and lesbian movement and the more 
recent movement for marriage equality, see generally JO BECKER, FORCING THE SPRING:  
INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2014); CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 
91; LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY:  THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION—HOW A DESPISED 
MINORITY PUSHED BACK, BEAT DEATH, FOUND LOVE, AND CHANGED AMERICA FOR EVERYONE 
(2014); SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS, ALL THE RAGE:  THE STORY OF GAY VISIBILITY IN 
AMERICA (2001); LONG ROAD TO FREEDOM:  THE ADVOCATE HISTORY OF THE GAY AND 
LESBIAN MOVEMENT (Mark Thompson ed., 1994); THE NEW YORK TIMES TWENTIETH 
CENTURY IN REVIEW:  THE GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Vincent J. Samar ed., 2001); and Molly 
Ball, How Gay Marriage Became a Constitutional Right, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-supreme-court-politics-
activism/397052/ [https://perma.cc/KWS8-J7U7]. 
 94. Ball, supra note 93. 
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that made the idea of gay marriage seem plausible, desirable, and right.”95  
As a result of these processes, the idea that gays and lesbians deserved the 
same legal rights and social status as everyone else slowly, with occasional 
setbacks, but inexorably, became the mainstream view.  This evolution in 
attitudes made the Court’s dignity decisions possible. 
Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, American attitudes toward 
homosexuality, and toward gays and lesbians as people, began to change both 
markedly and rapidly.  As the pace accelerated over the next two decades, 
pollsters and scholars of public opinion would describe the changes as 
“unprecedented”96 and a “sea change.”97  The change on the question of 
marriage equality was especially profound.  As two political scientists have 
commented, the rate of attitudinal change about same-sex marriage was 
“simply stunning and defies typical patterns of public opinion.”98  One 
conservative commentator summed up the phenomenon this way:  “The gay 
rights movement has made enormous strides over the past few decades, and 
the recent surge in public support for the once unthinkable concept of same-
sex marriage reflects this quite radical shift in American culture.”99 
In 2000, three years before Lawrence, political scientists Kenneth Sherrill 
and Alan Yang documented changes in public attitudes toward gays and 
lesbians in an article aptly titled “From Outlaws to In-Laws:  Anti-Gay 
Attitudes Thaw.”100  The article highlighted positive trends in attitudes 
toward gays and lesbians as expressed through such measures as the “feeling 
thermometer” used by National Election Studies, support for employment 
nondiscrimination laws, and support for hate crimes laws.101  Sherrill and 
Yang found it especially significant that a large majority—76 percent—
supported a federal law to increase the penalty for bias-motivated crimes 
against gays and lesbians.  “This statistic,” they wrote, “suggests that the 
lesbian and gay movement has at least partially succeeded in transforming 
lesbians and gays into an intelligibly recognized minority group.”102 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Chris Cillizza, How Unbelievably Quickly Public Opinion Changed on Gay Marriage, 
in 5 Charts, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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6-charts/ [https://perma.cc/NSD8-HJY2]. 
 97. Shankar Vedantam, Shift in Gay Marriage Support Mirrors a Changing America, 
NPR (Mar. 25, 2013, 3:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/2013/03/25/174989702/shift-in-gay-
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 98. BRIAN F. HARRISON & MELISSA R. MICHELSON, LISTEN, WE NEED TO TALK:  HOW TO 
CHANGE ATTITUDES ABOUT LGBT RIGHTS 1 (2017). 
 99. David Lampo, Why Gay Rights Are Civil Rights—and Simply Right, AM. 
CONSERVATIVE (July 8, 2013), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/why-gay-
rights-are-civil-rights-and-simply-right/ [https://perma.cc/EV4F-DTAA]. 
 100. Kenneth Sherrill & Alan Yang, From Outlaws to In-Laws:  Anti-Gay Attitudes Thaw, 
11 PUB. PERSP. 20, 20–23 (2000). 
 101. Id. at 21, 23. 
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Even if Americans were not ready to see marriage equality extended to 
gays and lesbians,103 by the early 2000s public attitudes were moving 
steadily in a direction that was increasingly difficult to reconcile with the 
purpose of sodomy laws:  to express moral disapproval of gays and lesbians 
by making their sexual activity a crime.  It is instructive, then, to look at what 
was happening outside the Court in the years before Lawrence. 
In November 1985, a few months before the Court upheld sodomy laws in 
Bowers v. Hardwick,104 44 percent of Americans said they thought “gay or 
lesbian relations between consenting adults should . . . be legal,” while 
47 percent thought they should not be.105  But by the time Lawrence was 
decided in 2003, the official moral condemnation that was the purpose of 
sodomy laws had become inconsistent with Americans’ evolving attitudes 
toward gays and lesbians. 
First, support had rapidly declined for criminalizing gay sex.  In early May 
2003 (a few weeks before Lawrence was announced), the number of 
Americans agreeing that gay sex should be legal had reached a high of 
60 percent, with only 35 percent saying it should be illegal.106  The last time 
a plurality of Americans had said gay and lesbian relations should be illegal 
was 1996, and the last time a majority had registered that view was 1988.107 
Beyond sodomy laws, attitudes about gays and lesbians more generally 
also were evolving.  The same Gallup poll in May 2003 showed that 
54 percent agreed that “homosexuality should be considered an acceptable 
alternative lifestyle,” up from 34 percent in 1982.108  Increasing numbers of 
Americans said that they thought “being gay or lesbian” was “something a 
person is born with.”109  Eighty-eight percent agreed that “homosexuals 
should . . . have equal rights in terms of job opportunities.”110  Seventy-nine 
percent would accept a gay or lesbian person as a member of the president’s 
cabinet (up from 54 percent in 1992), and 61 percent would accept them as 
an elementary school teacher (up from 41 percent in 1992).111 
 
 103. Id. at 22–23 (observing that “[i]nclusion and equality in . . . marriage and the 
family . . . might be seen as different in kind when compared to inclusion and equality in the 
polity or sectors of the economy,” and that forces including “centuries of moral 
disapprobation” and “natural-law based assumptions of legitimate family and relational 
arrangements” worked “in tandem with existing social, political and economic arrangements 
that reproduce heterosexuality (and heterosexual family forms), to reinforce existing ideas 
about what constitutes a legitimate marriage and family” (emphasis added)). 
 104. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 105. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37. 
 106. Id.; see also ANDREW R. FLORES, WILLIAMS INST., NATIONAL TRENDS IN PUBLIC 
OPINION ON LGBT RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (2014), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/POP-natl-trends-nov-2014.pdf 
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legalizing same-sex sexual relations”). 
 107. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37. 
 108. Id. 
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 111. Id. 
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Evolving public attitudes supported legal reform in the states.  The Model 
Penal Code had taken the view since 1955—almost a half century before 
Lawrence—that states should not provide for “criminal penalties for 
consensual sexual relations conducted in private.”112  Although sodomy laws 
were once widespread—all fifty states had them until 1961, when Illinois 
repealed its sodomy statute113—by the time of Lawrence all but thirteen 
states had eliminated them through legislative reform or state judicial 
decision,114 and only four applied them exclusively to gay sex.115  By 1998, 
the year that John Lawrence and Tyrone Garner were arrested in Lawrence’s 
Houston home, sodomy laws had become essentially relics that were 
“arbitrarily enforced”116 and, as a practical matter, had fallen into 
desuetude.117  Even when sodomy laws were more common, they typically 
were not “enforced against consenting adults acting in private.”118  Even as 
Texas defended its sodomy law by telling the Court that the “prohibition of 
homosexual conduct . . . represents the reasoned judgment of the Texas 
Legislature that such conduct is immoral and should be deterred,”119 it 
admitted that “the statute is unlikely to deter many individuals with an 
exclusively homosexual orientation.”120 
A month after Lawrence, Gallup found that 32 percent of Americans said 
that their “attitudes toward gays and lesbians” had “become . . . more 
accepting” over the “past few years,” compared with only 8 percent who said 
they had become less accepting.121  And more than half of respondents—
56 percent—said they had friends, relatives, or coworkers who had come out 
to them as gay or lesbian, more than twice the number in 1985.122 
Americans were becoming personally more familiar with gays and 
lesbians because large numbers of them were coming out each year.  The 
rising visibility of gays and lesbians in daily life was arguably the single 
greatest factor in the rapid transformation of American society and culture 
toward opposition to sodomy laws and support for marriage equality.  As 
political scientist Jeremiah J. Garretson has written, “it is this increased 
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exposure—in the form of interpersonal and mediated contact with lesbians 
and gays—that has largely defined the most prominent features of opinion 
change on gay issues:  its broadness, its durability, its rapidity, and its 
concentration among the millennial generation.”123  When the Pew Research 
Center asked Americans in 2013 what had caused them to change their minds 
in support of same-sex marriage, the largest single answer was that they 
“know someone . . . who is homosexual.”124  All this suggests that these 
attitudinal changes were not simply shifts in abstract political preferences, 
but were driven by an appreciation for the dignity of gays and lesbians as 
people and by an appreciation for the dignitary harms that anti-gay laws 
imposed on gay family members, friends, neighbors, or coworkers. 
To be sure, the advancements being made by gays and lesbians generated 
political resistance.  No state expressly defined marriage as a union between 
a man and a woman before Maryland did so in 1973 “in an apparent response 
to attempts by same-sex couples to obtain marriage licenses.”125  Two 
decades later, in 1993, a decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. 
Lewin126 looked as though it might make Hawaii the first state to allow legal 
same-sex marriage.  Same-sex marriage ultimately was not legalized in 
Hawaii due to a constitutional amendment approved by the state’s voters.127  
Baehr set off a rapid series of “backlash measures” that became a “mainstay 
of the [same-sex marriage] controversy.”128  In 1996, Congress enacted 
DOMA, which, according to its lead sponsor, was “designed to thwart the 
then-nascent move in a few state courts and legislatures to afford partial or 
full recognition to same-sex couples.”129  DOMA’s legislative history was 
characterized by blunt anti-gay bigotry of a kind that would be nearly 
impossible to imagine coming from any legislative body today.130  States also 
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began approving statutes, constitutional amendments, or both banning same-
sex marriage (commonly referred to as “mini-DOMAs”).131  The anti-
marriage-equality movement intensified after the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court in 2003 made that state the first to legalize same-sex 
marriage.132  By 2012, some forty states banned same-sex marriage, thirty-
one of these by state constitutional amendment.133 
In retrospect, these measures must be understood as products of an intense 
but transitory period of backlash and adaptation.134  The measures were 
sponsored and promoted by religious-conservative activists and Republican 
politicians who exploited public uncertainty about the meaning and 
implications of same-sex marriage coupled with greater rights and visibility 
for gays and lesbians.  At the time, some saw these measures as serious 
setbacks for the cause of marriage equality.135  Yet remarkably, even after 
the enactment of the federal DOMA and throughout the era of the mini-
DOMAs, national public support for same-sex marriage continued its steady, 
long-term upward trend.136 
During the ten years between Lawrence and Windsor, trends in public 
attitudes toward gays and lesbians continued in this positive direction.  A 
study published by the Russell Sage Foundation found that in 2010, 
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“a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of marriage.” Id. at 4, 
12. 
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68 percent of Americans said that gay men or lesbians living with children 
fit within their definition of “family,” up more than 10 percent from 2003.137  
Over the same period, the number of Americans reporting that they did not 
have any gay friends or family members decreased from 58 percent to 
40 percent, and in 2010 only 18 percent said they did not know anyone who 
was gay.138 
Three months before Windsor was decided in 2013, the Pew Research 
Center reported that “[t]he rise in support for same-sex marriage over the past 
decade is among the largest changes in opinion on any policy issue over this 
time period.”139  The “long-term shift” in attitudes toward marriage equality 
was “unambiguous.”140  In the months leading up to Windsor, a number of 
media and polling companies reported that support for same-sex marriage 
had moved above 50 percent.141  Gallup found that 53 percent of Americans 
thought “marriages between same-sex couples should . . . be recognized by 
the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages”—a number 
that had been steadily increasing from 27 percent in 1996.142  Pew found that 
66 percent agreed that “same-sex couples should have the same legal rights 
as heterosexual couples”143—which, of course, was inconsistent with 
DOMA, as DOMA denied married same-sex couples all the federal rights 
that opposite-sex couples received.  A poll in early 2013 specifically about 
DOMA found that 59 percent of Americans opposed allowing the federal 
government to deny benefits and protections to legally married same-sex 
couples, and 62 percent agreed that doing so was a form of 
“discrimination.”144 
Opinion polling tells only part of the story.  Polls measure attitudes, which 
both respond and contribute to changes in the larger culture.  In the decades 
leading to the marriage decisions, the status of gays and lesbians in that larger 
culture had changed dramatically.  Gays and lesbians had become visible in 
media and popular culture.145  Their support was sought by political parties 
and politicians, including a presidential candidate as early as 1991, Bill 
Clinton, who told a crowd of gay and lesbian advocates, “I have a vision of 
America, and you are part of it.”146  Congress had voted to lift the ban on 
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gays serving openly in the U.S. military.147  Many religious denominations 
had become more welcoming.148  The Boy Scouts had lifted their ban on gay 
members and were moving toward also lifting their ban on gay adult 
leaders.149  Dozens of openly gay politicians were winning elections in every 
cycle, in offices ranging from city council to U.S. Senate.150  More and more 
same-sex couples were adopting and raising children.151  A president in 2012, 
Barack Obama, endorsed marriage equality,152 and a majority of U.S. 
senators also supported it.153  Also in 2012, voters in four statewide 
referenda—in Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington—legalized 
same-sex marriage, which broke a string of more than thirty previous defeats 
around the country.154  By the day Windsor was decided, nine states and the 
District of Columbia had legalized same-sex marriage by legislative vote, 
popular referendum, or state judicial decision.155 
By the time of Obergefell two years later, majority support for same-sex 
marriage had become unambiguous, and the steady long-term upward trend 
line demonstrated that this was not an ephemeral or transitory state of affairs.  
Several polling sources reported that support was at “record” highs of 
60 percent or more.156  Much of the change was driven by generational 
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replacement—much larger shares of younger Americans than older 
Americans supported same-sex marriage.157  But it was also clear that 
Americans of all generations, races, religions, and party affiliations were 
increasing their support for same-sex marriage.158 
This change was evident even in the arguments states used in federal 
litigation to defend their same-sex marriage bans.  The campaigns to enact 
the mini-DOMAs had sought to arouse negative attitudes toward gays and 
lesbians,159 and “many of those who defended a traditional understanding of 
marriage repeatedly challenged the notion that same-sex relationships were 
as good (or as loving or as committed) as different sex ones.”160  Yet in 
federal court, the states took pains not to argue that the bans were justified 
because gays and lesbians were immoral or in some way unfit for marriage.  
For example, Michigan claimed that “[b]y reaffirming the definition of 
marriage that has always existed in Michigan, Michigan’s voters did not 
disparage other relationships or deny the obvious point that same-sex couples 
can provide loving homes.”161  Instead, the states argued that the bans 
advanced their government interest in promoting “responsible 
procreation.”162  That the states felt it necessary to build their defenses 
around an hypothesized purpose that struck many observers as absurd—the 
Court in Obergefell would dismiss the responsible procreation theory as 
“counterintuitive”163 and “wholly illogical”164—was in itself powerful 
evidence of how much had changed in American attitudes and culture. 
III.  DIALOGIC JUDICIAL REVIEW 
This Part turns to the theoretical framing that is necessary to my overall 
thesis that Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell should be understood 
collectively as illustrating the process of dialogic judicial review.165  My 
point of departure is Barry Friedman’s work on “dialogue and judicial 
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review,”166 which argues that the Constitution “is interpreted on a daily basis 
through an elaborate dialogue as to its meaning” that involves the courts, 
political actors such as legislatures, and the people generally.167  Through 
this process, constitutional law emerges from a larger social and cultural 
dialogue in which the Court participates and to which it responds. 
In this dialogic model, courts “do not stand aloof from society and declare 
rights.  Rather, they interact on a daily basis with society, taking part in an 
interpretive dialogue.”168  As a result of this process, Friedman writes in The 
Will of the People:  How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court 
and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s decisions 
“hew rather closely to the mainstream of popular judgment about the 
meaning of the Constitution” and “tend to converge with the considered 
judgment of the American people.”169  In this process, “[p]opular politics and 
Court decisions, moving together sometimes in harmony and sometimes not, 
have shaped the meaning of the Constitution.”170  Other constitutional 
scholars and historians have “converg[ed] around a similar set of ideas and 
understandings.”171  Harry Kalven seemed to have something like this in 
mind when he described the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as “a 
sort of Socratic dialogue . . . between the Court and the society as to the 
meaning of freedom of speech.”172 
Friedman’s work fits within a larger line of commentary, going back to a 
seminal 1957 article by Robert Dahl,173 which states that the Court 
“generally stays within bounds that the American people will tolerate”174 and 
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that it is, in practice, more often than not a “majoritarian” institution.175  
Research in political science also has found that the Supreme Court tends to 
be responsive to public preferences.  One study based on Court decisions 
from 1953 to 1996 concluded that “the Court’s policy outcomes are indeed 
affected by public opinion . . . to a degree far greater than previously 
documented.”176 
The idea of dialogic judicial review goes beyond just the principle that the 
Court’s decisions tend to align with public preferences.  Under the dialogic 
model, not only does the Court listen and respond to public attitudes, its 
decisions also contribute to shaping public attitudes or perceptions about an 
issue, a proposition for which there is empirical support in social science 
literature.177  According to Friedman, “Constitutional change occurs as 
public understandings of constitutional meaning and judicial interpretations 
of the Constitution interact with one another.”178  As a result, “judicial 
meanings shift in response to changing public understandings, and judicial 
decisions provoke the public to consider what the Constitution ought to 
mean.  Through this interaction, the Constitution changes.”179  Such a 
process necessarily is “open-ended . . . and so the process must go on with 
another and yet another question being put.”180  Judicial determinations about 
the Constitution’s meaning are rarely final, and public resistance or backlash 
to particular decisions (such as Roe v. Wade181 with abortion or Furman v. 
Georgia182 with the death penalty)183 will cause the Court to trim its sails in 
later decisions and sometimes to reverse itself altogether.184 
The idea of dialogic judicial review puts in perspective the role of the 
judiciary as a so-called “countermajoritarian” institution.  The starting point 
in this line of commentary is Alexander Bickel’s now-classic 1962 work The 
Least Dangerous Branch, in which Bickel coined the term 
“countermajoritarian difficulty” to describe the question of why an unelected 
judiciary should have the power to decide important issues in a way that the 
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states or political branches have no direct power to override.185  While not 
diminishing the importance of the question Bickel presented or the fact that 
some of the Court’s decisions truly have been countermajoritarian (flag 
burning comes to mind186), dialogic judicial review demonstrates that the 
problem is far from pervasive in constitutional law because most decisions 
are (or shortly become) consistent with consensus, or at least majority, views 
about the Constitution’s meaning.187 
In a related vein of scholarship to Friedman’s work on dialogue and 
judicial review, Robert Post, Reva B. Siegel, and other scholars have 
explained how constitutional law is shaped by courts’ interaction with 
nonjudicial actors.  Post distinguishes between “constitutional law”—that is, 
“constitutional law as it is made from the perspective of the judiciary”—and 
“constitutional culture,” which embraces “the beliefs and values of 
nonjudicial actors . . . that encompass[] extrajudicial beliefs about the 
substance of the Constitution.”188  Post argues that “constitutional law and 
culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both 
arises from and in turn regulates culture.”189  The constitutional law that 
emerges from this “dialectic between constitutional culture and the 
institutional practices of constitutional adjudication” is, Post explains, 
“neither autonomous nor fixed.”190  Because constitutional law does not exist 
independent of culture, “constitutional law properly evolves as culture 
evolves.”191  Because “culture is always dynamic and contested, 
constitutional law will necessarily also be dynamic and contested.”192  Social 
movements play a role in this dialectic process of constitutional culture by 
developing a constitutional language for their own claims,193 as do the cause 
lawyers who “aim to change the law in ways that restructure dominant social 
configurations that marginalize or oppress certain groups.”194 
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Siegel has defined “constitutional culture” as “the network of 
understandings and practices that structure our constitutional tradition, 
including those that shape law but would not be recognized as ‘lawmaking’ 
according to the legal system’s own formal criteria”195 and as “the 
understandings of role and practices of argument that guide interactions 
among citizens and officials in matters concerning the Constitution’s 
meaning.”196  Constitutional culture “mediates the relation of law and 
politics” and “supplies understandings of role and practices of argument 
through which citizens and officials can propose new ways of enacting the 
society’s defining commitments.”197  It also “enables [social] movements to 
negotiate the law/politics distinction and propose (or resist) alternative 
understandings of the constitutional tradition.”198 
This understanding of constitutional culture shares common themes with 
Larry Kramer’s work on “popular constitutionalism,” which advocates a 
return to the founding generation’s view of the Constitution as “a special 
form of popular law, law made by the people to bind their governors, and so 
subject to rules and considerations that made it qualitatively different from 
(and not just superior to) statutory or common law.”199  Rejecting “judicial 
supremacy” as inconsistent with the model the framers intended, Kramer 
argues that “[w]e need processes, formal and informal, by which our 
constitutional understandings and commitments can be challenged, 
reinterpreted, and renewed.”200  Kramer has lauded work by Siegel and 
others that seeks to understand the “external” influences on constitutional 
law, calling it “the new center of academic work in constitutional theory.”201 
The views of elites, including judges on state and federal courts, also play 
a role in shaping how constitutional ideas move from being “off the wall” to 
“on the wall,” as Jack M. Balkin has described the phenomenon.  “Arguments 
move from off the wall to on the wall,” he writes, “because people and 
institutions are willing to put their reputations on the line and state that an 
argument formerly thought beyond the pale is not crazy at all, but is actually 
a pretty good legal argument.”202  Further, “it matters greatly who vouches 
for the argument—whether they are well-respected, powerful and influential, 
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and how they are situated in institutions with professional authority or in 
institutions like politics or the media that shape public opinion.”203 
The work of David Strauss, who is perhaps best known for his exposition 
of the idea of a “living constitution,”204 also fits within the dialogic model as 
I am broadly defining it in this Article.  The gay and lesbian dignity cases 
provide useful examples of what Strauss has called “common law 
constitutional interpretation.”205  The common-law approach “rejects the 
notion that law must be derived from some authoritative source,” such as 
constitutional text alone, “and finds it instead in understandings that evolve 
over time.”206  Strauss has written that much of modern judicial review 
“looks to the future, not the past” and “tries to bring laws up to date, rather 
than deferring to tradition.”207  Such judicial review “anticipates and 
accommodates, rather than limits, developments in popular opinion.”208  One 
way that courts engage in the modernizing form of judicial review is to 
“strike down a statute if it no longer reflects popular opinion or if the trends 
in popular opinion are running against it.  Modernization tries to anticipate 
developments in the law, invalidating laws that would not be enacted today 
or that will soon lose popular support.”209  Strauss suggests that this form of 
judicial review has emerged in response to the criticism of judicial review as 
antidemocratic.  The approach of “anticipating changes that have majority 
support” gives judicial review “a more comfortable place in democratic 
government.”210 
Of course, there are differences in approach among all these scholars 
whose work I include within the dialogic model as I am describing it in this 
Article.  But they all contrast starkly with scholars and jurists who take 
exception to the idea that constitutional law should be understood as 
something malleable that may be shaped according to public attitudes, 
culture, or social change.  For example, the late Justice Antonin Scalia, one 
of the best-known proponents of originalism as an alternative to the living 
constitution, frequently argued that “[t]he Constitution is a written 
instrument.  As such its meaning does not alter.  That which it meant when 
adopted it means now.”211  Yet despite the proliferation of academic 
commentary that originalism has created, it would be difficult to argue, as an 
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 211. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 81 (2012) (quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)). 
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empirical matter, that the Supreme Court does not regularly adapt the 
Constitution’s “majestic generalities,”212 such as liberty and equal 
protection, to fit modern circumstances.  Dialogic judicial review, as I have 
described it above, attempts to explain the legitimacy of that enterprise.  My 
goal in the remainder of this Article is to demonstrate that the gay and lesbian 
dignity cases, considered collectively, provide a useful illustration of how it 
works. 
IV.  THE LAWFULNESS OF THE DIGNITY DECISIONS 
In the previous two Parts I sketched the rapid and dramatic changes 
achieved by the social movement for gay and lesbian equality and described 
dialogic constitutional interpretation.  In this Part, I bring those discussions 
together to describe how the trilogy of gay and lesbian dignity cases 
demonstrates a Supreme Court in dialogue with the larger society on the 
question of how the Constitution should account for the changing social 
meaning of particular forms of government-imposed discrimination against 
gays and lesbians. 
This Part’s argument can be sketched as follows.  The social meaning of 
government discrimination has long played an important role in 
constitutional decisions involving equality and the treatment of minority 
groups.213  In particular, laws that are commonly understood to demean and 
impose stigma are repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, in both its 
original and contemporary understandings.214  Using this anti-stigma 
principle, the Supreme Court condemned criminal sodomy laws and federal 
and state marriage restrictions.215  As American attitudes and culture evolved 
concerning the status of gays and lesbians, so did the social meaning of 
government anti-gay discrimination.216  By invoking the idea of “dignity” in 
these decisions, the Court was both interpreting and helping to further 
construct social meaning.  The bedrock principles of these decisions, that 
gays and lesbians had “a just claim to dignity” and “dignity in their own 
distinct identity,”217 which most Americans once would have rejected, were 
now consistent with mainstream public attitudes and culture.  The Court gave 
legal substance to this attitudinal and cultural change when it concluded that 
the social meaning of sodomy laws and marriage restrictions was now 
understood to be the imposition of dignitary harm—that is, the kind of stigma 
and humiliation that could be reached by the Fourteenth Amendment.  This 
Part concludes with some observations about the additional dignitary harms 
engendered by the countermajoritarian nature of the state marriage bans.218 
 
 212. William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech at the Georgetown University Text and Teaching 
Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/democracy/ 
sources_document7.html [https://perma.cc/ZU4M-V9PC] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 213. See infra Part IV.A. 
 214. See infra Part IV.B. 
 215. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 216. See infra Part IV.C. 
 217. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015). 
 218. See infra Part IV.D. 
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The fact that the Court’s holdings in the gay and lesbian dignity cases 
aligned with the American majority’s preferred policy outcomes would 
merely make them majoritarian.  But the fact that the Court reached those 
holdings by interpreting and helping to construct the social meaning of the 
laws at issue in these cases made them dialogic.  In other words, these cases 
were more than simply examples of the Court following public opinion.  And 
the fact that they ultimately rested on well-established constitutional norms 
made them legitimate and lawful. 
A.  Social Meaning in Constitutional Law 
“Social meaning” refers to “the semiotic content attached to various 
actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context.”219  Lawrence 
Lessig has said that social meanings are “frameworks of understanding 
within which individuals live; a way to describe what they take or understand 
various actions, or inactions, or statuses to be.”220  Social meaning is another 
way of referring to a law’s expressive effect.  As Lessig observes, “[I]f an 
action creates a stigma, that stigma is a social meaning.”221 
The Court’s equality decisions often have articulated and exposed the 
social meaning of particular forms of government discrimination by 
providing candid descriptions of how the discrimination was experienced by 
the targeted group and by providing candid discussion of the denigrating 
message this discrimination communicated about the group’s standing in the 
political community.  For example, social meaning has been a prominent 
focus of many of the Court’s racial equal protection cases.  In one of the first 
cases applying the Fourteenth Amendment to laws discriminating on the 
basis of race, Strauder v. West Virginia,222 which invalidated a state law 
excluding blacks from serving as trial jurors, the Court called the statute 
“practically a brand upon [blacks], affixed by the law, an assertion of their 
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to 
securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to 
secure to all others.”223  This is a classic statement about social meaning. 
An example of the Court attempting to impose a reading of social meaning 
that did not ring true even at the time it was written came in Plessy v. 
Ferguson.224  Examining a law that required separate accommodations for 
white and black railroad passengers, the Court denied that the law had the 
same social meaning—that is, the same stigmatic effect and dignitary harm—
as the jury law in Strauder.  The constitutionality of the railroad law in Plessy 
turned on this supposed difference in social meaning.  “Laws permitting, and 
even requiring” the physical separation of blacks and whites “do not 
 
 219. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 
(1995) (footnote omitted). 
 220. Id. at 952. 
 221. Id. at 951. 
 222. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
 223. Id. at 308. 
 224. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other,” the Court 
maintained.225 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in 
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the 
colored race with a badge of inferiority.  If this be so, it is not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to 
put that construction upon it.226 
The Court’s refusal to acknowledge the obvious social meaning of enforced 
segregation is a primary reason why Plessy is regarded today as not only 
flawed but disingenuous. 
The social meaning of racial discrimination also was central to Brown v. 
Board of Education,227 where the Court observed, without the need to cite 
any authority, that “the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted 
as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”228  This blunt statement of 
social meaning was essential to the Court’s further conclusion, which was 
supported with citations to social science research,229 that “[t]o separate 
[black children] from others . . . solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”230 
In a famous article titled “The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,” 
Charles Black observed, about the critics of Brown, 
It seems that what is being said [by such critics] is that, while no actual 
doubt exists as to what segregation is for and what kind of societal pattern 
it supports and implements, there is no ritually sanctioned way in which the 
Court, as a Court, can permissibly learn what is obvious to everybody else 
and to the Justices as individuals.231 
Black scoffed at the need for “[e]legantia juris and conceptual algebra” in 
evaluating the harms of government-enforced segregation.232  To find for 
purposes of constitutional adjudication that mandatory school segregation 
offended the Constitution, it was sufficient to articulate its social meaning, 
as the Court had done.  “[T]he fact that the Court has assumed as true a matter 
of common knowledge in regard to broad societal patterns, is (to say the very 
least) pretty far down the list of things to protest against.”233 
 
 225. Id. at 544. 
 226. Id. at 551. 
 227. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 228. Id. at 494. 
 229. See id. at 494 n.11. 
 230. Id. at 494. 
 231. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 
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 232. Id. at 429. 
 233. Id. at 428.  In later civil rights era cases, articulation of social meaning allowed the 
Court to candidly expose the machinations of southern racists.  In Anderson v. Martin, 375 
U.S. 399 (1964), for example, the Court struck down a Louisiana election law that required a 
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such a law “furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate 
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Through laws and policies, governments contribute to the creation of 
social meaning.234  Laws and public policies “act to construct the social 
structures, or social norms . . . the social meanings that surround us.  For 
these social meanings are what is orthodox.  They constitute what is authority 
for a particular society, or particular culture.”235  The social meaning of a law 
is not necessarily the same thing as the government’s purpose or intent, or 
the lawmakers’ motives.236  Thus, it is possible to conclude that a law has the 
operation and effect of imposing stigma on a group without concluding that 
it was the government’s purpose to do so.237 
Courts also interpret, construct, and reinforce social meaning through 
judicial review.  Deborah L. Brake writes that “[e]quality claims are largely 
about challenges to existing social meaning and the reconstruction of social 
relationships based on changes in social meaning.”238  Equality claims 
“challenge[] existing status hierarchies and the social meanings that have 
held them in place.”239  Richard H. Pildes has argued that, rather than 
thinking about constitutional rights as trumps, which is how constitutional 
theory and political philosophy tend to understand them, we should 
understand rights as “tools courts use to evaluate the social meaning and 
expressive dimensions of government action”240 and that “[i]ncorporating a 
theory of social meaning and the expressive dimensions of state action into 
 
against one group because of race and for another.” Id. at 402.  The social meaning of a 
requirement that race be listed in the ballot was clear:  the law placed “the power of the State 
behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls.” Id. 
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 235. Id. at 947. 
 236. Id. at 953; see also Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off:  
The Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 582 (2004) 
(“The expressive meaning of an action is not necessarily a function of the actor’s intent; rather, 
it is the socially constructed meaning that is recognizable by the community, exercising 
interpretive judgment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 237. For example, as Carlos Ball has written, the Court in Obergefell 
did not claim, as it had in striking down the Defense of Marriage Act in United 
States v. Windsor, that the marriage bans were the result of animus against lesbians 
and gay men.  Instead, the Court in Obergefell emphasized the harmful, demeaning, 
and stigmatizing consequences of denying same-sex couples the opportunity to 
marry.  Rather than focusing on the intent or motivations behind the bans, the Court 
focused on their impact. 
Carlos A. Ball, Bigotry and Same-Sex Marriage, 84 UMKC L. REV. 639, 639–40 (2016) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 238. Brake, supra note 236, at 573. 
 239. Id. at 574. 
 240. Pildes, supra note 24, at 725.  Pildes argues that “American constitutional law 
provides a more expansive conception of harm because it is more attuned than conventional 
rights theory appreciates to the social meanings of state action.  Expressive harms, no less than 
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areas.” Id. at 762. 
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constitutional analysis can reconnect constitutional theory to constitutional 
practice.”241 
The Court’s exposition of social meaning has shaped equality doctrine by 
helping to define the forms of discrimination the Constitution forbids.  
Elizabeth Anderson and Pildes have argued that “[t]he most conventional 
expressive concerns with equal protection doctrine involve issues of stigma 
and second-class citizenship.”242  Michael Dorf writes that “expressivist 
notions” of harm are “deeply embedded” in American constitutional 
doctrine243 and that “a cross-ideological consensus holds that some 
government expressions of second-class citizenship offend equal protection 
precisely because of their social meaning.”244  Expressive harm, Pildes says, 
“results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental action 
rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the action brings 
about.”245  Accordingly, “the meaning of a governmental action is just as 
important as what that action does.  Public policies can violate the 
Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs but because the 
meaning they convey expresses inappropriate respect for relevant 
constitutional norms.”246  On this understanding, constitutional law is less 
about identifying and protecting certain individual rights and more about 
“secur[ing] a common good,” and “judicial interpretation of that common 
good, not an atomistic conception of rights,” is what “propels constitutional 
law.”247 
The Court’s decisions both identify and help to further construct social 
meaning.  Its use of social meaning may be both descriptive, in that it 
captures current attitudes, and normative, in that it seeks to educate and 
persuade those who are not yet part of the majority.  Many of the Court’s 
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decisions on seemingly controversial subjects are majoritarian.248  Yet, to say 
a decision is “majoritarian” is not necessarily to say that it yet reflects a 
widely shared consensus or what Bickel called “general assent.”249  Social 
meaning can also be contestable.250  And so the Court’s decisions also seek 
to lead, teach, and persuade.  This, too, is consistent with the dialogic model 
of judicial review.251  The Court’s intervention can become part of the 
process by which social meaning is constructed, including by reinforcing 
emerging and, in some cases, majoritarian attitudes and values.252 
B.  Stigma as a Constitutional Injury 
The previous section focused on social meaning in constitutional law 
generally.  But one particular form of social meaning has been central to 
Fourteenth Amendment law, including the gay and lesbian dignity cases:  the 
imposition of stigma.  Laws that demean or inflict stigma without a legitimate 
public-regarding purpose have long been understood to be repugnant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.253  This principle goes back to the drafting and 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.  As Christopher A. Bracey 
writes, “Dignitary and stigmatic harms were the hallmark of the slavery 
regime” and the Reconstruction Amendments “directly repudiated Justice 
Taney’s declaration in Dred Scott that blacks could not be citizens because 
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they were widely regarded by whites as ‘beings of an inferior order, and 
altogether unfit to associate with the white race.’”254 
Appeals to dignity were used in popular political dialogue not only to 
attack slavery but to also attack practices of racial subordination more 
generally.  Rebecca J. Scott writes that “[t]he late nineteenth-century popular 
campaign against legally mandated racial segregation . . . drew upon a 
language of dignity, sometimes echoing the uses in earlier French radical 
thought of the term dignité.”255  Whereas supporters of government-imposed 
segregation portrayed such laws as “aimed merely at maintaining familiar 
customs, public comfort, and public order,” opponents “saw an intentional 
dignitary offense, precisely because of the ways in which legally mandated 
segregation reproduced forms of humiliation practiced against free persons 
of colour under slavery.”256  This treatment implicated social meaning.  “The 
meaning—and the marking—involved in the practice of forced separation 
could, in their view, best be understood with reference to the slaveholding 
past, as constituting a project of white supremacy for the post-emancipation 
future.”257 
Similarly, even if modern cases like Brown and Loving v. Virginia258 
(which invalidated restrictions on interracial marriage) do not actually use 
the word “dignity,” these cases plainly address the dignitary harms that are 
imposed by laws whose social meaning was well understood to be racial 
subordination.259 
The Fourteenth Amendment was, of course, intended to address the 
inequality of the newly freed slaves in the wake of the Civil War.  But its 
drafters and supporters “just as clearly intended its beneficial effects to 
extend beyond” race to also reach “class legislation” and “caste systems.”260  
Consistent with this understanding, Romer v. Evans,261 the Court’s first 
significant gay rights case, opened by quoting the first Justice John Marshall 
Harlan’s declaration that “the Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens’”262 and ended with the conclusion that the Colorado 
law at issue was unconstitutional because it “classifies homosexuals not to 
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further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone 
else.”263  In recent years—Romer and Windsor both figure into the relevant 
line of cases—the Court has made clear that a law’s expression of “animus” 
toward a social group is not a legitimate government purpose.  This 
“prohibition on animus reflects a core constitutional commitment, one that is 
most forcefully expressed in the [Fourteenth Amendment].”264 
The anti-caste, anti-stigma understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
closely related to the principle of “anti-humiliation” that Bruce Ackerman 
has identified as the core of Brown and the Court’s other racial equal 
protection cases of the Second Reconstruction.265  Ackerman has written that 
the “master insight” of Brown was “the Court’s emphasis on the distinctive 
wrongness of institutionalized humiliation.”266  Ackerman links this anti-
humiliation principle to the idea of dignity both in constitutional law and in 
the political discourse around civil rights, which suggests that the anti-
humiliation principle may give the “notoriously protean” idea of dignity a 
more “distinctive shape.”267 
In an op-ed written after Windsor but before Obergefell, Ackerman 
elaborated on this idea, suggesting that the “constitutional legacy” of the 
dignity principles “hammered out during the civil rights revolution of the 
1960s . . . would strongly support any future Supreme Court decision 
extending Justice Kennedy’s reasoning to state statutes discriminating 
against gay marriage.”268  Kenji Yoshino amplified this point by arguing that 
the anti-humiliation principle informed the Court’s invocations of dignity in 
both Windsor and Lawrence.269  “The gay rights domain,” he suggests, “may 
provide a particularly sympathetic context from which dignitary claims 
would arise, given that gay rights have always been plagued by a politics of 
shame.”270  Moreover, “the fact that gay individuals are dispersed throughout 
families and institutions across the United States may make their claims to 
dignity more intelligible than the traditional ‘discrete and insular 
minority.’”271 
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C.  Dignity and the Evolving Social Meaning of Sodomy Laws 
and Marriage Restrictions 
As the gay and lesbian social movement generated changes in American 
culture and as public attitudes evolved, sodomy laws and marriage 
restrictions came to be rejected by growing majorities of Americans.272  The 
Court’s role as a participant in the national legal and political dialogue over 
the status of gays and lesbians was to translate this evolution of public 
attitudes and culture into conclusions about social meaning and stigma, and 
it used the language of dignity to do so. 
When government power acts on a person in some way, the implications 
for dignity are a function of social mores and shared understandings.273  In 
Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell, the Court was interpreting how 
Americans had come to understand the status of gays and lesbians in society 
and contributing to the construction of how the social meaning of criminal 
sodomy laws and federal and state marriage restrictions had changed.  The 
central dignitary problem with criminal sodomy laws and federal and state 
marriage restrictions was that they inflicted “stigma.”274  Their effects were 
to “demean” gays and lesbians.275  Once widely understood as necessary to 
protect public morality, such laws were now increasingly understood, the 
Court told us, as denials of dignity.  This interpretive work was an important 
aspect of the Court’s contribution to the dialogue over gay and lesbian rights 
and dignity and another sign that it was not merely following public opinion, 
but also helping to shape it. 
The social and cultural change documented in Part II, together with the 
lack of any widespread public backlash to these decisions,276 suggest that the 
Court faithfully captured the social meaning of sodomy laws and marriage 
restrictions.  By the time the Court suggested in Obergefell that gays and 
lesbians had a “just claim” to “dignity in their own distinct identity,”277 and 
were thus entitled to “equal dignity” under law,278 a majority of Americans 
had already formed attitudes that were consistent with that principle. 
These decisions were not “the work of a partisan elite” scorning popular 
morality and “imposing its policy preferences on the American people,” as 
one academic critic of Obergefell has written.279  Rather, they were the work 
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of a Court that was aware of a tectonic shift in public attitudes and culture 
and that was shaping these changes into a legal principle—that the 
Constitution neither knows nor tolerates classes or castes among citizens—
that was anchored in the purpose and values of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The kinds of laws that violate constitutional norms may evolve, but the 
fundamental norms remain constant. 
This approach to evaluating the constitutionality of laws was consistent 
with the ideas that “government expressions of second-class citizenship” can 
be repugnant to the Constitution “precisely because of their social 
meaning”280 and that “[p]ublic policies can violate the Constitution not only 
because they bring about concrete costs but because the meaning they convey 
expresses inappropriate respect for relevant constitutional norms.”281  As 
Shari Seidman Diamond and Andrew Koppelman have written, “The social 
meaning of government action has always been understood to be relevant to 
the determination of whether a law denies to some ‘the equal protection of 
the laws.’”282  Stephen G. Calabresi has written that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s anti-caste principle justified the Court’s decision in Obergefell 
to strike down state bans on same-sex marriage because the effect of such 
discrimination was that it led gays and lesbians to be “treated as outcasts.”283 
The word “dignity” captures a basic idea about how government should 
treat citizens.  Dignity is about “the status of a person within the 
community.”284  As Ronald Dworkin explains, human dignity “supposes that 
there are ways of treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him 
as a full member of the human community, and holds that such treatment is 
profoundly unjust.”285 
The dignity of Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell is striking for its 
accessibility.  It is the dignity of human beings as the idea is understood by 
ordinary people.  It is a dignity that captures intuitions about what it means 
to be a free and autonomous human being who expects to be treated with 
respect, both by one’s fellow citizens and by the government.  The Court 
applied dignity as legal concept, but it spoke about dignity almost entirely in 
the vernacular. 
For Justice Kennedy, dignity served more as a dialogic device than a 
component of formal doctrine.  Tribe has written that “Justice Kennedy’s 
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rhetoric of equal dignity, particularly in his series of gay-rights decisions, has 
always been fundamentally rooted in the importance of fostering dialogue 
among ordinary citizens.”286  Justice Kennedy once observed to an audience 
of law students that “[j]udges are teachers.  By our opinions, we teach.”287  
Tribe believes that Justice Kennedy’s approach in Obergefell, particularly his 
invocations of dignity, reflects his “view of the Court’s role in helping to 
structure and stimulate public debate regarding the rights that should be 
afforded to LGBT individuals and to same-sex couples, as well as the 
evolving character of marriage as an institution.”288 
It is not just their use of dignity in a vernacular idiom that makes the gay 
and lesbian dignity decisions dialogic.  It is also their portrayals of gays and 
lesbians as real persons, and their candid descriptions of why and how anti-
gay government discrimination had come to acquire the social meaning of 
stigma and humiliation.  In this way, the decisions provide a nice illustration 
of Jack M. Balkin’s argument that “behind every constitutional interpretation 
there lies a narrative, sometimes hidden and sometimes overt, a story about 
how things came to be . . . things we still have to do, things that we learned 
from past experience, things that we will never let happen again.”289 
The focus on gays and lesbians as human beings worthy of dignity 
becomes clearer with each decision, part of a dialogic evolution.  In an earlier 
gay-rights decision, Romer, the Court struck down a Colorado state 
constitutional amendment that invalidated any state or local law that 
protected gays and lesbians from discrimination and imposed onerous 
political-process burdens to prevent future enactment or reenactment of such 
laws.  Romer did not invoke the dignity of gays and lesbians or speak about 
them in a personalized way.  It essentially spoke about them as a political 
interest group.290 
By contrast, Lawrence addressed gays and lesbians as human beings who 
engage in intimate relationships—certainly a dramatic about-face from 
Bowers only seventeen years earlier, which had painted the social meaning 
of homosexuality as dark, if not menacing.291  According to Lawrence, gays 
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and lesbians were entitled to make the same personal choices about sexuality 
that were “central to personal dignity and autonomy”292 as heterosexuals, and 
they were entitled to maintain sexual relationships “in the confines of their 
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free 
persons,”293 a dignity that would be lost if such conduct could be 
criminalized.  Sodomy laws operated as “punishment and . . . state-sponsored 
condemnation”294 by imposing “stigma” and carrying significant “imports 
for the dignity of the persons charged.”295  They served only to “demean” the 
“existence” of gays and lesbians.296  Such laws “control” the person’s 
relationship choices and seek to “define the meaning of [a] relationship,”297 
thereby costing gays and lesbians “their dignity as free persons.”298 
Although the Court in Lawrence spoke of gay and lesbian sexuality in 
terms of human relationships that were entitled to dignity, it said nothing 
about the petitioners or their particular relationship.  In Windsor, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion began with a warm and empathetic recounting 
of the relationship between the respondent, Edith Windsor, and her wife, 
Thea Spyer.299  Justice Kennedy described them as having “longed to 
marry”300 and spoke approvingly of the social change that had led New York 
to recognize their marriage.301  In electing to confer legal marriage on same-
sex couples, states were seeking to give same-sex couples “recognition, 
dignity, and protection . . . in their own community,” not only with legally 
defined sets of “incidents, benefits, and obligations,” but with a “status of 
immense import.”302 
The opinion then shifted tone to condemn the harm imposed by DOMA, 
focusing on its social meaning and expressive effects.  DOMA’s “avowed 
purpose and practical effect” were to impose “a disadvantage,” “a separate 
status,” and “a stigma”;303 to “disparage,” “humiliate,” and “injure.”304  
DOMA tells same-sex couples “and all the world[] that their otherwise valid 
marriages are unworthy of federal recognition.”305  It “instructs all federal 
officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, 
including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the 
marriages of others.”306 
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As Windsor had opened with sympathetic words about Windsor and Spyer, 
Obergefell described the circumstances of plaintiffs from three of the 
underlying cases to illustrate “the urgency of the petitioners’ cause.”307  The 
descriptions are deeply respectful, emphasizing the plaintiffs’ earnest 
struggles in the face of the indignities of state-sponsored discrimination. 
The first plaintiff was James Obergefell himself, who was seeking not the 
right to marry but merely the right to be listed as legal spouse on his recently 
deceased husband’s death certificate.308  “By statute, they must remain 
strangers even in death,” the Court observed, “a state-imposed separation 
Obergefell deems ‘hurtful for the rest of time.’”309  The second set of 
plaintiffs were a pair of nurses, April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse, who were 
raising adopted children with serious health issues and sought “relief from 
the continuing uncertainty their unmarried status creates in their lives” and 
those of their children.310  The third set of plaintiffs were an Army Reserve 
sergeant and his husband whose “lawful marriage is stripped from them 
whenever they reside in Tennessee, returning and disappearing as they travel 
across state lines.”311  The Court noted that the reservist, Ijpe DeKoe, had to 
endure this “substantial burden” even though he had “served this Nation to 
preserve the freedom the Constitution protects.”312 
After recounting these human stories, the Court used plain, accessible 
language to describe the social meaning of the state marriage bans as 
dignitary harms—they “impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by 
our basic charter.”313  When the opposition of legislators or citizens to same-
sex marriage “becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary 
consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that 
soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is denied.”314  And 
“[e]specially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships,” to 
“impos[e] . . . this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and 
subordinate them” and “works a grave and continuing harm.”315  Being 
denied the benefits of marriage consigns same-sex couples “to an instability 
many opposite-sex couples would deem intolerable in their own lives.”316  
Exclusion from the right to marry “has the effect of teaching that gays and 
lesbians are unequal in important respects.”317 
A simple comparison will underscore this Article’s point about social 
meaning and the Court’s vernacular use of dignity.  In Obergefell, the Court 
forcefully condemned the state marriage bans as demeaning, stigmatizing, 
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and a denial of dignity.318  Now, imagine if the Court had said the same thing 
in the course of striking down bans on plural marriage.  Obviously, such a 
decision would have been met with outrage, disbelief, and resistance. 
This comparison demonstrates why Chief Justice Roberts missed the point 
when he claimed in his Obergefell dissent that “much of the majority’s 
reasoning would apply with equal force to the claim of a fundamental right 
to plural marriage” and that “[i]f a same-sex couple has the constitutional 
right to marry because their children would otherwise ‘suffer the stigma of 
knowing their families are somehow lesser,’ . . . why wouldn’t the same 
reasoning apply to a family of three or more persons raising children?”319 
The answer is that bans on plural marriage do not have the same negative, 
invidious social meaning for most Americans as the bans on same-sex 
marriage.  A 2017 Gallup poll found that only 17 percent of Americans 
thought polygamy was “morally acceptable.”320  The Court’s use of dignity 
in the gay and lesbian cases referred not to an abstract legal right, but to 
Americans’ evolved understanding about how their gay and lesbian fellow 
citizens should be treated.  Obergefell resonated with most Americans; a 
decision striking down bans on plural marriage would not.  As the 
Washington Post noted in an article after Obergefell, polygamists seeking 
legal recognition for a right to marry “will always be at a disadvantage 
compared to the LGBT community” because “[u]nlike sexual orientation, 
polygamy isn’t something most people will ever confront in their daily lives, 
nor is [it] thought of as a trait someone is born with.”321  Leaving aside 
whether it could be justified doctrinally, a decision striking down plural 
marriage would have been a top-down imposition of judicial will.  
Obergefell, with its dialogic pedigree and its reliance on social meaning, was 
not. 
D.  Dignity and the “Democratic Process” 
This Part concludes by briefly considering a separate but related dignity 
issue:  the dignitary harm imposed on a group when the ordinary political 
process is unresponsive to its claims, even though those claims have majority 
support.  Sometimes, it turns out, courts are more responsive to public 
preferences than bodies of elected representatives.  This section primarily 
focuses on Obergefell because most of the state marriage bans, unlike 
sodomy laws or the federal DOMA, had been the subject of voter referenda, 
and thus Obergefell raised the most salient concerns about the Court’s 
relationship to the democratic process. 
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Critics of the Court’s gay and lesbian dignity decisions have accused the 
Court of “judicial hubris”322 (Lawrence) and misusing its power to “put fear 
into the hearts of anyone who does not share the belief that homosexuality is 
morally neutral, or morally good” (Windsor).323  Opponents of Obergefell 
have insisted that the decision, in the words of one religious-conservative 
activist, “usurped the authority of the people, working through the 
democratic process, to define marriage.”324 
This line of criticism also was a core theme in the Obergefell dissents.  
Chief Justice Roberts said Americans were “in the midst of a serious and 
thoughtful public debate on the issue of same-sex marriage”325 and that 
change on such a matter should only come through the “democratic 
process.”326  Justice Scalia scorched the majority for perpetrating a “judicial 
Putsch” through “a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-
legislative—power.”327  The court below in Obergefell, in holding that state 
marriage bans did not violate the Constitution, also cast much of its opinion 
as a homily about the virtues of leaving decisions on a controversial question 
like same-sex marriage to “state democratic processes.”328 
It is necessary to untangle two different issues in the criticism of 
Obergefell:  the argument implied by some of its critics that it was 
countermajoritarian,329 and the complaint that, whatever the public’s views, 
the Court had usurped a question that should, as a matter of principle, be left 
to political decision-making.330 
The first criticism is plainly incorrect.  “The majority of the [C]ourt has 
simply replaced the people’s opinion about what marriage is with its own,” 
wrote one critic.331  But as I have already demonstrated, the Court did no 
such thing.  Its decision in Obergefell (as with Lawrence and Windsor), was 
consistent with solid and growing majority opinion among Americans, in this 
case about the legality of same-sex marriage.332  One might still object, as a 
matter of respect for federalism, that marriage equality did not enjoy majority 
support in every state.  But considering the steady upward trend of support 
for same-sex marriage among Americans in the aggregate—60 percent and 
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growing at the time of the decision333—Obergefell plainly was not 
countermajoritarian. 
The other criticism goes to the Court’s role vis-à-vis the process of 
democratic decision-making.  It is about who should decide:  the courts or 
the people.  The Obergefell majority opinion addressed that criticism with 
the principle that “fundamental rights” like marriage “may not be submitted 
to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”334  Those who deny 
that same-sex marriage should be encompassed within this fundamental right 
will not be satisfied by that answer.  But consider another justification for the 
Court’s intervention:  the fact that many of the state marriage bans were 
themselves countermajoritarian—indeed, they had been intentionally 
designed to be virtually immune to change through the ordinary democratic 
process. 
As previously discussed by this author at greater length elsewhere,335 the 
majority of the state marriage bans enacted between the 1990s and 2012 were 
in the form of state constitutional amendments.  Whereas ordinary laws can 
be changed by simple legislative majorities responding to changes in their 
constituents’ policy preferences, these amendments were “intended to freeze 
marriage discrimination in place and put it beyond the reach of ordinary 
democratic deliberation, future legislative reconsideration, and state judicial 
review.”336 
The result was that although attitudes rapidly evolved, state laws did not.  
In March 2014, thirty-three states prohibited same-sex marriage, yet in those 
states collectively, the public supported marriage equality by a margin of 53 
to 40 percent.337  The four states whose laws were before the Court in 
Obergefell—Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee—all banned same-
sex marriage by state constitutional amendment.  By early 2015, a few 
months before Obergefell, popular majorities in Michigan and Ohio favored 
marriage equality.338  In Kentucky and Tennessee, support for same-sex 
marriage had been rising at an estimated rate of more than 2 percent per year 
as of 2012.339  Yet, had proponents in any of those states managed to 
 
 333. Gay and Lesbian Rights, supra note 37. 
 334. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
 335. Steve Sanders, Mini-DOMAS as Political Process Failures:  The Case for Heightened 
Scrutiny of State Anti-Gay Marriage Amendments, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 12 (2014). 
 336. Id. at 14. 
 337. Peyton M. Craighill & Scott Clement, Support for Same-Sex Marriage Hits New High; 
Half Say Constitution Guarantees Right, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/support-for-same-sexmarriage-hits-new-high-half-
say-constitution-guarantees-right/2014/03/04/f737e87e-a3e5-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c 
_story.html [https://perma.cc/ALU2-TWAM]. 
 338. Joanna Piacenza, State of the States on Same-Sex Marriage, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. 
(Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.prri.org/spotlight/state-of-the-states-on-gay-marriage/ 
[https://perma.cc/G33P-5BG7]. 
 339. Joshua Tucker, If Same-Sex Marriage Is So Popular, Why Does It Always Lose at the 
Ballot Box?, MONKEY CAGE (May 15, 2012), http://themonkeycage.org/2012/05/if-same-sex-
marriage-is-so-popular-why-does-it-always-lose-at-the-ballot-box-includes-state-level-data-
on-support-and-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/Q8K5-FLSZ]. 
2019] DIGNITY AND SOCIAL MEANING 2111 
persuade their state legislatures and governors to support marriage equality, 
nothing would have happened.  Even when a social group enjoys emerging 
support for its claims about legal rights, the group may not have the resources 
and political muscle that are necessary to defeat or reverse a constitutional 
amendment.  The large number of successful mini-DOMA campaigns—no 
mini-DOMA proposal was ever defeated until 2012340—underscores this 
point. 
Some commentators, even if they endorse the idea of a Constitution that 
evolves alongside national values, argue that patterns of enacted state laws 
are a better barometer of national values than public opinion surveys or 
“more general evidence of an American societal consensus.”341  But what 
happens when ordinary state lawmaking processes are systematically 
unresponsive to public preferences?  Under most versions of democratic 
theory, a well-functioning democracy “requires some minimal matching of 
government choice to citizen preference.”342  Yet, that often fails to happen 
for a variety of reasons.343  One reason is interest group capture.  A 2009 
study by two political scientists of state policies affecting gays and lesbians 
found that on questions of gay rights, the preferences of “[p]owerful 
conservative religious interest groups” usually were “overrepresented,” 
which resulted in policies that were sometimes incongruent with overall 
public attitudes.344 
The phenomenon of courts sometimes vindicating majority preferences 
when representative institutions fail to do so has become so familiar that one 
commentator has labeled it “upside-down judicial review.”345  Sometimes, 
writes Corinna Barrett Lain, “[t]he branches most majoritarian in theory are 
least majoritarian in practice, and vice versa” and “a Supreme Court ruling 
may just look countermajoritarian because the base line against which it is 
judged—the ostensibly majoritarian stance of the legislative and executive 
branches—is not majoritarian after all.  Sometimes in a representative 
democracy, the representative branches aren’t.”346  Other scholars have 
explored this same phenomenon.347 
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A full discussion of how and why lawmakers sometimes fail to give 
Americans the policies they want is beyond the scope of this Article and is 
the subject of a large literature in public-choice theory.  But the topic 
deserves some attention here because it responds to criticisms that Obergefell 
inappropriately cut short the operation of the democratic process around 
marriage equality,348 it provides an additional perspective on the potential 
merits of dialogic judicial review, and it highlights an additional dignity 
issue—the indignity that comes when the democratic process is unresponsive 
to a minority group’s claims and when it has been engineered through 
political mechanisms like constitutional amendments to remain 
unresponsive. 
In sum, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell are properly understood as 
dialogic because their holdings—invalidating sodomy laws, DOMA, and 
state marriage bans—squarely confronted the demeaning and stigmatizing 
social meaning of these laws, social meaning that was informed by public 
attitudes, social-movement activism, and other developments in 
constitutional culture.  Rapid and inexorable change in the direction of 
greater personal and civic dignity for gays and lesbians made it possible for 
the Supreme Court to interpret and help construct the changing social 
meaning of sodomy laws and marriage restrictions, confident that Americans 
would accept its characterization of these laws as dignitary harms that were 
incompatible with constitutional norms of equality and liberty.  Each 
decision built upon the one before, and the Court’s rulings also helped to 
inform public attitudes.  Through these decisions, the Court was bringing 
constitutional law into alignment with the “considered judgment of the 
American people.”349  But the Constitution did not change in its fundamental 
principles.  The Court used “dignity” in a way that bridged its legal and 
vernacular meanings and that advanced a principle that is well-established 
under constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process:  that 
government may not demean and impose stigma on certain groups through 
class legislation.  Obergefell, in particular, illustrates how the dialogic 
process of judicial review can respond to public preferences in a way the 
ordinary democratic process may not. 
V.  THE DIGNITY DECISIONS AS MODELS OF DIALOGUE 
The previous Part demonstrated how dialogic judicial review in the gay 
and lesbian dignity cases was driven by the Court’s awareness and 
articulation of the changing social meaning of government anti-gay 
discrimination.  This Part expands upon that discussion to explain how these 
cases fit well within the dialogic model of judicial review in more general 
ways:  the decisions accurately captured majority attitudes, contributed to the 
advancement of changes in law and public attitudes, and forthrightly 
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embraced social and cultural change while articulating an evolving 
conception of constitutional equal protection and due process. 
A.  The Decisions Reflected Majority Preferences 
At the most basic level, dialogic judicial review is premised on the idea 
that when the people speak, the Court listens.350  It follows that one way we 
can know that a decision is consistent with this dialogic process is if it is 
supported by a stable majority of the people at the time or if it accurately 
anticipates the clear direction in which public attitudes are moving.  
“Majoritarian” is not the same thing as “dialogic,”351 but a decision cannot 
be said to reflect the “will of the people” if it does not at least eventually 
come to command majority assent. 
There is room for debate about how large the majority support for a 
decision should be under the dialogic model—is 51 percent enough?  Sixty?  
Eighty?  It is possible to argue that constitutional law should only be based 
on something closer to a “consensus” than a majority.352  Bickel referred to 
a standard of “general assent.”353  Setting aside the difficulty of defining 
“consensus” or “general assent,” that question is beyond the scope of this 
Article because it goes to a related but separate question:  the democratic 
legitimacy of any particular decision.  Dialogic judicial review is not a 
standard—it is a process.  It is possible to conclude that the Court is listening 
and interacting with the public but that it still disagrees about how strong 
public sentiment should be before a decision becomes legitimate 
“constitutional authority.”354 
The data and discussion presented in Part II demonstrate that Lawrence, 
Windsor, and Obergefell were all majoritarian decisions in that their holdings 
produced results—eliminating the criminalization of gay sex, invalidating 
DOMA, and removing state-imposed impediments to legal same-sex 
marriage—that were consistent with the policy preferences of growing 
majorities.355  At the time of Lawrence, 59 percent of Americans agreed that 
“gay or lesbian relations between consenting adults” should be legal, up from 
33 percent in 1986.356  The number rose to 72 percent by 2017.357  At the 
time of Windsor, strong majorities opposed DOMA’s policy of 
nonrecognition of valid same-sex marriages.358  At the time of Obergefell, 
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60 percent said same-sex marriage should be legal, up from 27 percent in 
1996.359  The number would rise to 67 percent in 2018.360 
Perhaps the best evidence that the Court correctly read and described the 
nation’s understanding of the social meaning of the laws in these cases was 
the lack of any significant backlash.  To be sure, the decisions have been 
criticized as unconventional in their legal reasoning,361 and some 
commentators have attempted to create a misleading narrative of the Court 
substituting its judgment for that of the people.362  But it is obvious that most 
of the public accepted them. 
For example, Lawrence, although momentous in its meaning for the 
equality and dignity of gays and lesbians, was not controversial.  Shortly after 
the decision, conservative legal scholars Nelson Lund and John O. McGinnis 
observed that, compared to an enduringly controversial decision like Roe v. 
Wade, “[o]ne can hardly foresee a similar passion for overturning a judicial 
decision that merely eliminates a few haphazard prosecutions for private 
conduct that has no immediate effect on any third parties.”363  Lund and 
McGinnis correctly predicted that “most of the public can be counted on to 
respond to the immediate consequences of Lawrence with a yawn.”364 
Similarly, Windsor provoked little negative reaction—again, not 
surprising, since a majority of Americans at the time of the decision already 
opposed DOMA and supported marriage equality.365  Immediately following 
the decision, Time reported that the ruling was consistent with “public 
opinion trends.  The most recent polls suggest about 58% of Americans want 
to legalize gay marriage.  That marks a huge swing over the last few 
decades.”366  The same article also noted that, on the day of the decision, “[i]f 
you type the word ‘gay’ into Google, your search box turns rainbow.”367  The 
New York Times observed that Windsor showed “just how rapidly much of 
the country had moved beyond the [C]ourt.”368  A decision that “just three 
years ago would have loomed as polarizing and even stunning instead served 
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to underscore and ratify vast political changes that have taken place across 
much of the country.”369  In contrast to the widespread negative attitudes 
toward homosexuality only a few decades earlier, by 2013 
[w]ord that a celebrity wants to marry someone of the same sex, whether 
Neil Patrick Harris or Ellen DeGeneres, is treated as celebratory news in 
People magazine rather than scandalous in The National Enquirer.  And as 
the court surely noted in its deliberations, public sentiment on the issue has 
flipped.370 
These observations were confirmed by the public acceptance two years 
later of the Obergefell decision and the lack of significant backlash to the 
legalization of same-sex marriage nationwide.  The acceptance of Obergefell 
was all the more remarkable given the intense backlash that the marriage 
equality movement had encountered between the mid-1990s and the late 
2000s.371  A CNN poll immediately following the decision found that 
63 percent of Americans approved of Obergefell.372  One journalist who 
chronicled the history of the marriage equality movement observed that 
“[t]he country got out ahead of the Supreme Court so that the Supreme Court 
only seemed to be ratifying public opinion that was already there.”373  
Support for same-sex marriage in general continued its steady upward 
trajectory after the decision and reached 64 percent in 2017.374 
Efforts by same-sex marriage opponents to organize backlash against 
Obergefell mostly flopped.  Any negative reaction discernible to the general 
public was limited to a few high-profile incidents of disobedience by civil 
servants such as Kentucky County Clerk Kim Davis375—disobedience that 
most Americans found unjustified.376  Claims for religious exemptions from 
civil rights laws protecting gays and lesbians seeking wedding-related 
products and services generally have failed in the courts.  Alabama Chief 
Justice Roy Moore was suspended by the state’s Court of the Judiciary for 
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ordering the state’s probate judges to defy federal orders issued pursuant to 
Obergefell.377  Two years after Obergefell, political scientists Kimberly 
Martin and Chris Tecklenburg cataloged 147 “backlash” bills introduced in 
state legislatures in reaction to Obergefell, mostly measures that were 
described as protecting, in one way or another, the religious liberty of same-
sex marriage opponents.378  Only nine of these were enacted, and most did 
not even get a hearing.379 
B.  The Decisions Contributed to a Dynamic Process of 
Attitudinal Change and Legal Innovation 
Although dialogic judicial review implies that a decision will be supported 
by a stable majority of the people at the time or accurately anticipates the 
clear direction in which public attitudes are moving, dialogic judicial review 
is not just a matter of the Court’s decisions aligning with majoritarian 
preferences.  It is a continuing conversation.  In an area where there is 
ongoing litigation (as with gay and lesbian rights), decisions often build on 
one another:  the Court’s decisions may be final in a legal sense as to the 
question they decide, but they are also part of a constitutional culture that 
remains dynamic.380  Because the process “moves in fits and starts and along 
several tracks at once . . . it is ungainly and difficult to model.”381  But the 
public, social movements, courts, and politics all play a role in shaping the 
constitutional culture that informs the Court’s decisions,382 and these 
decisions in turn provoke further consideration and debate.383 
The gay and lesbian dignity trilogy followed this model.  Lawrence first 
introduced the ideas of dignity and concern for stigmatic harm against gays 
and lesbians that would be at the center of Windsor and Obergefell.384  
Lawrence also ruled out morality as a sufficient purpose for discriminatory 
laws when it was unaccompanied by any concrete objective harm.385  But the 
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effects of Lawrence on both law and culture could not have been foreseen at 
the time.  Writing in the decision’s immediate wake, Robert Post 
characterized it as “the opening bid in a conversation that the Court expects 
to hold with the American public.”386  Although Lawrence “advanced a 
powerful and passionate statement that is plainly designed to influence the 
ongoing national debate about the constitutional status of homosexuality,” 
Post believed that the Court had not yet “committed itself to the full 
consequences of its position.  It has crafted its opinion so as to allow itself 
flexibly to respond to the unfolding nature of public discussion.”387  The legal 
principles articulated in Lawrence would be clarified by the Court “in the 
context of changes in constitutional culture produced by the popular debate 
provoked by Lawrence.”388 
Similarly, David Strauss characterized Lawrence as an example of the 
“modernizing mission” of judicial review.389  Criminalizing gay sex had 
“little support in current sentiment.”390  Yet, by leaving other issues about 
gays and lesbians undecided and expressly disclaiming any notion that it was 
deciding the issue of marriage, the Court “left the door open for the political 
branches to tell it that popular sentiment will not support any extension of 
Lawrence.”391 
Nonetheless, Lawrence’s impact quickly became apparent.  It was cited a 
few months later by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the first 
court decision legalizing same-sex marriage in any state.392  It was also cited 
by the Iowa Supreme Court, in the second such state judicial decision, for the 
principle that the meanings of constitutional guarantees evolve with the 
times.393  Back in the U.S. Supreme Court, Lawrence was cited in Windsor 
for the principle that the Constitution protects the “moral and sexual choices” 
of same-sex couples.394  And Lawrence was cited in Obergefell for the 
principle that “[h]istory and tradition guide and discipline” constitutional 
analysis “but do not set its outer boundaries,” a flexibility that “respects our 
history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the 
present.”395 
Dialogic judicial review also implies that the Court is sensitive to just how 
much leeway it has with the public.  On the same day it struck down the 
federal DOMA in Windsor in 2013, it declined to take the more dramatic step 
in Hollingsworth v. Perry396 of declaring state anti-gay marriage laws 
unconstitutional.  It avoided the question on jurisdictional grounds.  
Nonetheless, the effect was to allow a district court decision striking down 
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California’s Proposition 8 to go into effect, thus legalizing marriage equality 
in the nation’s most populous state.  This prudent, one-step-at-time approach 
also was consistent with dialogic judicial review.  DOMA had long been 
unpopular—even its leading congressional sponsor had repudiated it397—but 
most states still outlawed same-sex marriage, and federal courts applying the 
federal Constitution had only recently begun adjudicating challenges to state 
marriage laws. 
Yet, legalizing same-sex marriage in the nation’s largest state would 
further normalize marriage equality and contribute to its increased public 
acceptance.  Political science research suggests that a minority group’s legal 
and political advancements can affect perceived social norms and lead to 
more positive public attitudes (or at least fewer negative attitudes) toward the 
group.398  “Institutional decisions in particular reinforce the idea that 
society’s norms are trending in a certain direction and indicate to many 
people that a norm is on the right side of history, that it will be viewed 
favorably in the future.”399  And, of course, more positive public attitudes 
help make possible further legal and political innovation. 
Windsor—with its admonitions about “disadvantage,” “separate status,” 
and “stigma”—triggered an uptick in the pace of marriage litigation in the 
federal courts and provided something of a guide to arguments that could be 
made against the state marriage bans as well.  The result was that “the rich 
debate among the American people on the issue of same-sex marriage . . . 
continued to occur through the federal litigation in the district courts.”400  As 
Emily Buss has written: 
While the federal district judges shifted the analysis to federal law, they did 
so in a role firmly grounded in local politics and culture.  In an area of law 
in which popular attitudes were shifting, not only about whether same-sex 
marriage should be permitted, but also whether it should be understood as 
a civil right, the federal district judges played an important role as state-
affiliated interpreters of the federal Constitution.401 
By the time the question of state same-sex marriage laws finally reached 
the Supreme Court in Obergefell, public support for marriage equality had 
risen to 60 percent, having steadily increased from 27 percent in 1996, to 42 
percent in 2004 (the year after Lawrence), to 54 percent the month after 
Windsor.402  Support continued to increase after Obergefell,403 as did 
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Americans’ perceptions about social norms (that is, what they believe other 
people think) concerning same-sex marriage.404 
C.  The Decisions Expressly Embraced Social and Cultural Change 
Dialogic judicial review is premised on the idea that “judicial decisions 
and public understandings swim in a current together and influence one 
another.”405  To an extent that has been underappreciated in other 
commentary about these decisions, the Court in the gay and lesbian dignity 
cases acknowledged—and signaled its approval toward—the changes in 
public understanding and American culture described in Part II.406  To be 
sure, the Court did not expressly characterize its decisions as mere responses 
to social change.  But its awareness of how the nation’s attitudes toward gays 
and lesbians had rapidly evolved—and were continuing to do so—is 
unmistakable, and this awareness contributes to the narrative of the Court’s 
reasoning in each decision. 
Lawrence characterized the invalidation of sodomy laws as a product of 
“emerging awareness” about sexual autonomy in general and the sexual 
choices of gays and lesbians in particular.407  Emphasizing the relevance of 
“our laws and traditions in the past half century,”408 the Court documented 
the downfall of sodomy laws that began in 1955 with the Model Penal Code 
and continued through the post-Bowers period, in which six more states got 
rid of their own sodomy laws through state judicial decision or legislative 
action.409  The Court confessed its own error in Bowers in “fail[ing] to 
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake”410 and failing to understand the 
“emerging recognition” that “liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining 
to sex.”411 
Lawrence implicitly rejected the static “history and tradition” approach to 
substantive due process of Washington v. Glucksberg.412  Instead, Lawrence 
underscored that constitutional protections evolve alongside social change: 
 Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of 
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.  
They did not presume to have this insight.  They knew times can blind us 
to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.  As the Constitution 
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endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.413 
The distance that both the nation and the Court had traveled in their 
attitudes toward gays and lesbians and their relationships was reflected by 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—a justice who was so often seen as a 
barometer of moderation and of the legal and political mainstream414—in her 
Lawrence concurrence.415  Justice O’Connor had joined the majority opinion 
in Bowers, whose language conveyed a harsh and dismissive attitude toward 
homosexuals.416  In Lawrence, Justice O’Connor disagreed with the 
majority’s use of substantive due process as the basis for invalidating the 
Texas sodomy law.417  She would have upheld sodomy laws that applied to 
everyone but used the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate those like 
Texas’s that only targeted gays and lesbians.418  But her opinion 
demonstrated a far different understanding of homosexuality and anti-gay 
government discrimination than the Bowers court. 
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that sodomy laws “inhibit[] personal 
relationships.”419  She also agreed that the Texas law “makes homosexuals 
unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular conduct—and only that 
conduct—subject to criminal sanction”420 and that the consequences of a 
conviction under the law were serious:  “Texas’ sodomy law brands all 
homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals 
to be treated in the same manner as everyone else.”421 
Justice O’Connor maintained that “Bowers did not hold that moral 
disapproval of a group is a rational basis under the Equal Protection Clause 
to criminalize homosexual sodomy when heterosexual sodomy is not 
punished.”422  This is a questionable reading.  Although the Georgia sodomy 
law was not limited to homosexuals, the Court made clear its view that “the 
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual 
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” was a sufficient rational basis to 
uphold the law.423  At any rate, by 2003, Justice O’Connor had come to 
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believe that “[a] law branding one class of persons as criminal based solely 
on the State’s moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with 
that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal 
Protection Clause, under any standard of review.”424 
While Lawrence spoke to social change mostly by discussing legal reform 
in the United States and other countries,425 not public attitudes, Windsor 
spoke freely and approvingly about the direction in which American society 
was moving on same-sex marriage.  The Court positioned itself as protector 
of the states that had decided to extend marriage equality to gays and lesbians 
against the interference of a hostile Congress.  The decision by some states, 
including Edith Windsor’s home state of New York, to extend marriage to 
gay and lesbian couples reflected “the community’s . . . evolving 
understanding of the meaning of equality.”426  The dawning of legal same-
sex marriage beginning in 2004 was made possible by “the beginnings of a 
new perspective, a new insight.”427  The exclusion of gays and lesbians from 
marriage “came to be seen in New York and certain other States as an unjust 
exclusion.”428  When New York legalized same-sex marriage, it was moving 
“to correct what its citizens and elected representatives perceived to be an 
injustice that they had not earlier known or understood.”429  The state was 
“responding ‘to the initiative of those who [sought] a voice in shaping the 
destiny of their own times.’”430 
Obergefell similarly spoke approvingly about evolving public attitudes 
and developments in the larger culture and did even more to characterize the 
national debate over same-sex marriage as an ongoing dialogue involving the 
public, lawmaking, and the courts.  These observations about dialogue, social 
change, and the evolving meaning of constitutional guarantees serve not just 
as background facts or dicta.  They are integral to the majority’s reasoning 
about why the constitutional right to marry should be extended to same-sex 
couples and why their exclusion from marriage was a dignitary harm. 
Obergefell begins by observing that the history of marriage itself “is one 
of both continuity and change” and that marriage is an institution that “has 
evolved over time.”431  The Court then ties this phenomenon of cultural 
change directly to both the lawmaking process and judicial review:  the 
changed understandings about marriage “are characteristic of a Nation where 
new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations, often 
through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are considered 
in the political sphere and the judicial process.”432 
 
 424. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 425. See id. at 576–77. 
 426. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692–93 (2013). 
 427. Id. at 2689. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. at 2692 (alteration in original) (quoting Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 
(2011)). 
 431. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015). 
 432. Id. at 2596. 
2122 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
The Court provides an extended and sympathetic discussion of the history 
of “the Nation’s experiences with the rights of gays and lesbians,”433 one that 
underscores the idea of an ongoing dialogue between courts and culture.  
Until the mid-twentieth century, gays and their intimacies were condemned 
and criminalized:  “many persons did not deem homosexuals to have dignity 
in their own distinct identity,” and “the argument that gays and lesbians had 
a just claim to dignity was in conflict with both law and widespread social 
conventions.”434  But “[i]n the late twentieth century, following substantial 
cultural and political developments, same-sex couples began to lead more 
open and public lives and to establish families.”435  There followed “a quite 
extensive discussion of the issue in both governmental and private sectors 
and by a shift in public attitudes toward greater tolerance.”436 
Soon, gay rights questions “reached the courts, where the issue could be 
discussed in the formal discourse of the law.”437  Despite the passage of 
DOMA in 1996, a “new and widespread discussion” of marriage equality led 
some states to legalize same-sex marriage beginning in 2003 through 
legislative action or state judicial decisions.438  By the time the question 
reached the Court a little more than a decade later, there had been “referenda, 
legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns . . .[,] countless studies, papers, 
books, and other popular and scholarly writings,” as well as “extensive 
litigation in state and federal courts.”439  Federal and state judicial opinions 
addressing marriage equality—of which there had been ninety-five by the 
time of Obergefell440—reflected “the more general, societal discussion of 
same-sex marriage and its meaning that has occurred over the past 
decades.”441 
While Obergefell notes the state and federal litigation over marriage 
equality that had been unfolding for more than a decade, the opinion is 
striking for its lack of reference to amicus briefs, expert testimony in the 
lower courts, or similar authorities.  It is as though the Court had so 
internalized the forces of social and attitudinal change, and the political and 
legal discourses that had accompanied it, that these became an organic part 
of its decision. 
Acknowledging that in 1972 it had dismissed a same-sex marriage case 
with a one-line summary disposition because it did not present “a substantial 
federal question,”442 the Court confessed in Obergefell that it, “like many 
institutions, has made assumptions defined by the world and time of which it 
is a part.”443  In interpreting the meaning of constitutional guarantees, “the 
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Court has recognized that new insights and societal understandings can 
reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that 
once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”444 
Finally, Obergefell expressly invokes principles of a living Constitution.  
The Court describes the Constitution as “a charter protecting the right of all 
persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning,” one that is open to “new 
insight [that] reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections 
and a received legal stricture.”445  Constitutional rights “come not from 
ancient sources alone” but “from a better informed understanding” of 
liberty’s contemporary meaning.446 
CONCLUSION 
The nation’s evolution—more accurately, revolution—in attitudes toward 
gays and lesbians contributed directly to a series of landmark decisions, one 
building upon the other, in which the Supreme Court expanded the meaning 
of the Constitution’s guarantees of equality and liberty.  The guiding 
principle of “dignity” provided harmony and discipline across these 
decisions.  Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell are best understood as a 
trilogy which provides insight into how the Supreme Court listens to the 
public, interprets the nation’s constitutional culture, and moves constitutional 
law forward in a way that remains sensitive and responsive to “the will of the 
people.” 
This Article has sought to illuminate one particularly dramatic and 
innovative example of dialogic judicial review, but in doing so, it suggests 
important questions for the ongoing scholarly dialogue about judicial review 
and the role of a constitutional court in a democratic society.  Do we 
necessarily want constitutional law to be “majoritarian”?  If so, how big, or 
how enduring, should the majority be in order to qualify as constitutional 
authority?  Should we trust the Supreme Court to interpret public attitudes 
and construct social meaning?  How does dialogic judicial review relate to 
more conventional tests and modes of constitutional analysis that lower 
courts must apply to questions of equality and liberty? 
Justice Felix Frankfurter famously observed that “[i]t is an inadmissibly 
narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words 
of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon 
them.”447  Striking the appropriate balance between fundamental 
constitutional principle and Americans’ lived experience remains the 
Supreme Court’s most profound challenge. 
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concurring). 
